Disease in the desert: Las Vegas as a case study of how first responders and emergency managers understand novel threats to human health and plan to respond during biological emergencies by Williamson, Monique
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
2009
Disease in the desert: Las Vegas as a case study of
how first responders and emergency managers
understand novel threats to human health and plan
to respond during biological emergencies
Monique Williamson
University of Nevada Las Vegas
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Emergency Medicine Commons, Health Policy Commons, International Public
Health Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations,
Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.
Repository Citation
Williamson, Monique, "Disease in the desert: Las Vegas as a case study of how first responders and emergency managers understand
novel threats to human health and plan to respond during biological emergencies" (2009). UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional
Papers, and Capstones. 158.
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/158
DISEASE IN THE DESERT: LAS VEGAS AS A CASE STUDY OF HOW  
FIRST RESPONDERS AND EMERGENCY MANAGERS  
UNDERSTAND NOVEL THREATS TO HUMAN 
 HEALTH AND PLAN TO RESPOND  
DURING BIOLOGICAL 
 EMERGENCIES  
 
 
 
by  
 
 
 
Monique Williamson 
 
 
 
Bachelor of Arts, Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
2006 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the  
 
 
 
Master of Arts Degree in Political Science 
Department of Political Science 
College of Liberal Arts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate College  
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
December 2009
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Monique Williamson 2010 
All Rights Reserved  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
 
 
 
THE GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
We recommend that the thesis prepared under our supervision by 
 
 
Monique Williamson 
 
 
entitled 
 
 
Disease in the Desert:  Las Vegas as a Case Study of How First 
Responders and Emergency Managers Understand Novel Threats to 
Human Health and Plan to Respond During Biological Emergencies 
 
 
be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 
Master of Arts 
Political Science 
 
 
Dennis Pirages, Committee Chair 
 
Kenneth Fernandez, Committee Member 
 
Tiffiany Howard, Committee Member 
 
Christine Springer, Graduate Faculty Representative 
 
 
Ronald Smith, Ph. D., Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies 
and Dean of the Graduate College 
 
 
December 2009 
 
 
 iii 
ABSTRACT  
 
Federalist Response to Widespread Pathogenic Invasion  
 
by 
 
Monique Williamson  
 
Dr. Dennis Pirages, Committee Chair  
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
 Over recent years it has become clear that technological advancements, 
globalization, and ecological change, combined with the onset of increased terrorist 
incidents, are all currently working to create an extremely hazardous environment in 
terms of pathogenic invasion. Realizing that infectious diseases are both newly emerging 
and re-emerging in many parts of the world, the question of how prepared an expansive 
United States will be in the face of an oncoming global pandemic is easily raised. Using 
Las Vegas as an example of just how unequipped a largely visited U.S. city may be in the 
face of such a situation, this thesis analyzes biological emergency preparedness methods 
amongst local emergency response agencies. No matter what the origin, during any large-
scale emergency it is extremely important for response to be quick and effective, with 
decision making responsibilities retained within agencies that posses strong 
understandings of local capabilities, rather than shifted towards federal agencies that do 
not often take into account unique local needs. For this reason, the following thesis will 
test the relationship that exists between emergency managers across different levels of 
disaster response in order to reveal the true effectiveness of a federalist-dominated 
disaster mitigation system.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In August 2000, the largest emergency-preparedness drill to date was conducted, 
named “Operation Top-Off, ” for Top Officials. Its purpose was to test the ability of a 
large scale American city to respond to a localized epidemic. After only a couple of hours 
of role-playing, “administration officials pretending to be state and local emergency 
responders were overwhelmed by the demands of thousands of hypothetically sick and 
dying people” (Miller et al, 2002, p.233). Local medical offices rapidly exhausted their 
stocks of antibiotics and vaccines, federal quarantine laws turned out to be too antiquated, 
and no state had adequate plans to take care of the people it had isolated, let alone any 
idea where to bury the still-contaminated dead. “Discovering huge gaps in logistics, legal 
authority, and medical care, officials began quarreling among themselves and with 
Washington over how to stem the epidemic,” and no one seemed to be in charge of the 
overall procedures (Miller et al, 2002, p.271). 
It has become apparent over recent years that many regions of the United States 
remain unprepared to deal with an infiltrating pathogenic threat. While the above 
scenario is just one example of how federal government intervention has only served to 
undermine and confuse, rather than guide and strengthen state response efforts, a larger 
problem exists. Thus far, policymakers at the local level have chosen to ignore the 
possibility of a large-scale disease epidemic taking hold on U.S. soil. This has not only 
allowed the country to remain unprepared for the threat, but has also removed from 
public discussion the likelihood of a mass pandemic destroying many regions of the 
country.   
 2
In today’s global environment it is no wonder that the country must prepare itself 
to deal with novel biological threats. Many diseases are currently re-emerging due to 
demographic changes such as urbanization as well as technological advancemans in 
travel that have allowed people to invade areas that were once isolated and remote. 
“Human encroachment of wildlife habitat has in fact broadened the interface between 
nature and humans, increasing opportunities for both the emergence of novel infectious 
diseases and their transmission to people” (Patz et al, 2004, p.1095). Throughout the 
coming chapters, multiple threats to human health stemming from a variety of different 
sources will be analyzed. Each source of threat requires a choreographed response by 
both emergency management teams and government agencies.  
“Hazards, disasters, and the multitude of dangers that exist in modern society are 
the reasons we have government,” yet government does not always respond and protect 
citizens as it should (Waugh, 2000, p.1). Specifically in the realm of emergency 
management, it appears that the country’s federal system often confuses effective 
response measures. Typically during a severe emergency, “federal, state, and local 
governments, operating with different mandates, levels of resources and staff 
backgrounds and capacities” scramble together to respond (Kettl, 2009, p.20). Such a 
system creates unnecessary overlap and competition, rather than coordination and 
cooperation between response agencies.  
Based on the hypothesis that technological advancements, ecological change, and 
the onset of increased terrorist incidents are all currently working to create an extremely 
hazardous environment in terms of pathogenic invasion, this thesis raises the issue of how 
prepared certain U.S. localities would be in the face an oncoming biological crisis. Using 
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the city of Las Vegas as an example, this thesis specifically poses the question of how 
prepared local emergency response agencies are to deal with a fast-spreading disease 
epidemic. In order to answer this question, local Las Vegas emergency managers were 
interviewed. From these interviews a second hypothesis became apparent; that in order 
for response to a human health crisis to be effective at the local level, the federal 
government must allocate resources responsibly and ensure that federalist, polycentric 
ideals regarding emergency response measures are preserved, rather than thwarted.  
Natural Threats to Human Health 
Looking at the most influential and calamitous events in human history, it appears 
as though many have been beyond human command. Oftentimes, the fate of humanity 
has rested not on its own doing, but on the natural world surrounding it. Thus by ignoring 
impacts of the natural world and overemphasizing humanity’s control over its own fate, 
many scholars have overlooked the power that the surrounding environment has upon all 
species (Hobhouse, 1990, p.128). 
Ecological factors have in fact led to cycles of human development and 
degeneration throughout recorded time. For most of human history the fates of scattered 
clans and tribes were largely determined not by war or politics, but by local constraints of 
nature, primarily the availability of food, water, and other resources, as well as by local 
encounters with pests, predators, and pathogens (Pirages, 2007). Since the success of a 
society is determined by how equipped and capable it is to adapt and respond to the often 
severe consequences of varying environmental factors, it is important to determine what 
potential scenarios may arise out of today’s changing global environment.  
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Currently, natural forces are shifting to alter the prospects of human societies in 
the form of much more resilient human diseases. Climatologists have stated that the 
current temperature of the globe is increasing rapidly, and since many outbreaks of 
disease are known to follow specific weather patterns such as extreme heat, disease 
epidemics are consequently on the rise. Furthermore, the vectors that carry many types of 
diseases thrive best in warmer climates, so as vector numbers increase, so do the numbers 
of disease epidemics that follow (Hunter, 2003, p.43).  
Ecological changes and corresponding shifts in rainfall in North America have 
thus far allowed mosquito populations to carry diseases like West Nile Virus to nearly 
every U.S. state. Similarly, wild birds following changing climatic migratory patterns can 
easily spread disease to new locations. Influenza viruses especially are known to be 
spread by birds. A key factor to influenza’s deadliness is that it is “among nature’s 
simplest and most mutation-prone RNA viruses,” allowing it to spread and survive easily 
between different types of species (Kellman, 2007, p.28). Recently, the world has seen 
the reemergence of both H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus and H1N1, also known as the 
“Swine Flu” due to this phenomenon.  
While Avian Influenza did not become a worldwide pandemic, the Swine Flu has 
become just such a disease, being passed and spread between humans on nearly every 
major continent. Originating in Mexico in late March 2009, within three months the 
World Health Organization (WHO) had reported seventy-four countries as being 
infiltrated by the flu, resulting in at least 28,780 cases worldwide. The U.S. alone 
reported more than 13,000 cases by early June 2009 and at least twenty-seven deaths. 
Despite its relatively miniscule mortality rate, it is the rapidity in which the flu has 
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spread, and the vast number of countries it has reached, that officially makes it a 
pandemic.  
Besides the influenza viruses described above, the recent emergence of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) has also shown leaders throughout the world just 
how fast an infectious disease in today’s time can cross borders and ruin global trade and 
travel. In just six months SARS was reported in over twenty-nine countries in Asia, 
costing the region almost 100 billion dollars in economic growth. One can thus easily see 
the damage that any infectious disease outbreak can have on a local region, not only in 
terms of health costs and losses of life, but in terms of economic sustainability and 
prosperity.  
Man-Made Threats to Human Health 
Threats to Human Health due to Advances in Transportation  
With this new age of social complexity, fast paced transportation and global 
interaction has left the contemporary world system perhaps more fragile than its 
predecessors in terms of susceptibility to infectious disease. Evidence of this is the fact 
that “in the year 2000, the World Health Organization officially announced that 
infectious diseases worldwide now represent a deadlier threat than war” (Cooper, 2006, 
p.115). Besides transporting humans and their diseases, technological innovations in 
travel have facilitated the growing global trade of agricultural products.  
Being able to transport exotic plants, animals, etc. around the world, has 
increasingly brought humans, animals, and plant life into greater contact with foreign 
diseases (Brower, 2003, p.15). Any physical contact occurring amongst previously 
separated biological specimens often facilitates the spread of disease, as a specimen is 
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more susceptible to novel microorganisms that it has had no previous interaction with. 
Many of the zoonotic diseases found in the United States, including Mad Cow Disease, in 
fact originated from imported animals.  
Over recent years, the policy of world trade has come to represent open borders 
and few barriers between nations, inevitably driving invasion by foreign species (Bright, 
1999, p.52). In the search for profit, recent international policies have encouraged the 
transfer of goods across borders, without taking into account the damage such 
interactions can cause to local populations. Besides the obvious spread of dangerous 
pathogens, newly integrated plants and animals can easily disrupt and destroy local 
ecosystems (Kawachi & Wamala, 2007, p.21). Such outsiders suppress native species by 
consuming resources that they would have used instead, thus altering the basic checks 
and balances of the region (Bright, 1999, p.58).  
This fact is significant to human health as “active ingredients from at least a third 
of all prescription drugs are derived from wild plants and fungi” (Pirages, 2007, p.4). As 
biodiversity is lost then, humans consequently become even more vulnerable to 
pathogenic threats. “In tropical forests alone, it was estimated by biologists that three 
species are being eliminated every hour by the habitat destruction caused by invasive 
species” (Gilpin, 2000, p.209). Ironically then, while bacterial invaders may be working 
to weaken humans through direct illness, they may also be working to indirectly promote 
illness by attacking naturally occurring medicines.  
Threats to Human Health due to Advances in the Biosciences 
Looking at past pandemic trends it is obvious that disease has always been a 
function of high populations, with humans only beginning to suffer significantly from 
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disease when populations reach a certain density (Hobhouse, 1990). While in the past 
there was a triangle of forces at play in which population growth affected the available 
food supply, resulting in famines that easily led to disease, mankind has since become 
capable of increasing its supply of food and defeating many diseases, thus allowing 
populations to grow unchecked (Hobhouse, 1990). Such growth has ironically allowed 
for more of the consumption, waste, and pollution that often produce new and much more 
deadly diseases. In today’s densely populated world then, humans will not be able to 
easily escape the onslaught of a mass pandemic, strengthening the potential lethality of 
any emerging disease.  
Besides suffering the consequences of increases in travel and extreme population 
growth, modern societies have also been exposed to biotechnological advancements in 
medicines that have allowed for acceleration in the emergence of counter resistance. 
According to the CDC, nearly all bacteria of concern have developed some resistance due 
to antibiotics over recent years (Brower, 2003, p.69). Many diseases have similar 
symptoms at onset leading to misdiagnoses and hence mistreatments that cause patients 
to be prescribed unnecessary antibiotics.  
Consistent misuse of antimicrobial drugs has resulted in the emergence of drug-
resistant strains of parasites, bacteria, and viruses. Thus “while scientific progress has 
certainly helped to mitigate the effects of certain infectious ailments, overuse and misuse 
of antibiotics both in humans and the agricultural produce they consume, has generated 
ever more resilient, resistant, and powerful disease” (Brower, 2003, p.17). So while pre-
pandemic vaccines and post-exposure drugs used to be the government’s answer to 
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epidemics, they are now believed to have caused healthy people to gain a tolerance and 
become immune over time. 
Additionally problematic with antibiotic use is that fact that there is now 
overconfidence in existing drugs. This has created a disincentive to develop new 
antibiotics for emerging diseases, leading to a dangerous lag (Hamburg et al, 2008, p.18). 
Within the Unites States, there are still not enough domestic stockpiles of many antiviral 
drugs. According to the CDC, the country has fifty million treatment courses of the main 
antiviral drugs Tamiflu and Relenza in the Strategic National Stockpile. Seven million 
courses of Tamiflu are strategically positioned and promised to the U.S. Department of 
Defense and twenty-five percent of the forty-three million courses left are to be shared by 
all the fifty states. Clearly, those states that first become infected will be prioritized, 
leaving others weak and vulnerable.   
Threats to Human Health Stemming from Biological Terrorism  
One of the main reasons biological agents are likely to become a weapon of 
choice by hostile groups is the fact that outbreaks of disease are often attributable to 
natural occurrences. Disease outbreaks have long been known to be used to bring down 
empires. “In Rome, there were at least eleven major disease outbreaks that undoubtedly 
originated in the Empire's periphery, and proved to be a significant limitation on the 
empire’s ambitions” (Pirages, 2007, p.11). Once the dominant society becomes weakened 
by disease, it easily falls prey to groups waiting to attack.  
Unleashing a biological agent is perhaps a better method of impairing large 
numbers than any other form of hostile attack.  It “does not announce itself with a large 
explosion…one cannot smell, taste, or see biological agents…[and] the attack is not 
 9
known until sick patients begin arriving in hospitals and doctor’s offices sometimes days 
after initial exposure” (Frist, 2002, p. 1). Such elements make detecting a disease prior to 
its mass dissemination amongst the public nearly impossible.  
Think Globally, Act Locally: Las Vegas as a Case Study 
Realizing that infectious diseases are currently both newly emerging and re-
emerging in many parts of the world, the question arises of how prepared the many 
separate regions of an expansive United States will be in the face of a devastating global 
pandemic. Using Las Vegas as an example of just how unprepared a largely visited U.S. 
city may be in the face of a fast-spreading infectious disease, local preparedness measures 
will be assessed. Las Vegas is a key city for observation, not only because it has been 
identified as a city likely to be attacked by terrorists by the Department of Homeland 
Security, but also because the city has over the years proven weak in its ability to provide 
medical care for its population, as well as maintain adequate numbers of medical staff. If 
an attack or pandemic of any sort were to therefore transpire, Las Vegas would be left 
particularly vulnerable to catastrophe in terms of mortality rates, etc.  
Within the city of Las Vegas, tourists from all regions of the world come to visit 
and can bring with them a variety of pathogens. According to the “Las Vegas City 
Guide,” approximately 30 million people visit Las Vegas each year. The city also has a 
unique immigration rate. According to the Nevada census, about thirty percent of the 
city’s population is composed of immigrants, many illegal. This is significant regarding 
the heath of Las Vegas because illegal immigrants are not screened medically like legal 
immigrants upon arrival, and thus may enter the city with any number of preexisting 
diseases (Brower & Chalk, 2003, p.64).  
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Regarding the health of Las Vegas’ non-transient population, the state of Nevada 
ranked forty-two in the 2008 America’s Health Rank (Pope, 2009 p.2). Additionally, 
poverty and homelessness are other major factors that contribute to poor health. In Las 
Vegas, the number of households facing foreclosure continues to double, causing it to be 
referred to as the “epicenter of the nation’s housing crisis” (Urevich, 2008). With loss of 
home and employment, the loss of health insurance often follows, and those struggling 
financially will find it difficult to receive appropriate preventative care, nutrition, etc., 
allowing them to become easily susceptible to many diseases.  
When discussing the protection of citizens from disease, the basic level of defense 
lies with local physicians who have the knowledge and hopefully expertise to identify 
and treat the problem. Another problem within Las Vegas then, is the fact that it has a 
health care system characterized by declining reimbursement for physicians’ services 
resulting in many physicians relocating out of the city to counter severe pay cuts (Debas, 
2003, p.978). Rising malpractice rates throughout the entire state of Nevada have also 
been blamed for further discouraging many physicians from remaining in practice within 
the state.  
Whether a biological pandemic stems from natural or man-made causes, any city 
under microbial attack would be forced to deal with either situation in an identical 
manner. First responders will be crucial, as they are the primary step in properly subduing 
the results of a catastrophe. Typically, first responders on the scene of an emergency are 
defined as: local law enforcement, members of the fire department, and those with 
sufficient medical expertise to properly treat victims. Unique to a disease epidemic, the 
first responders at the scene of any disease attack would also include experts from the 
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local health department, attempting to ascertain the origin and extent of any outbreak. 
First responders are the main sources of information for researchers attempting to obtain 
knowledge regarding preparedness in a state of biological emergency. As such, it is 
important to first discover how they understand the problem at hand. 
Interviewing heads of first responder teams is essential because the interaction 
that occurs between emergency managers and the federal government is key when 
speaking of ameliorating any sort of biological threat. While the federal government has 
many more resources to combat the effects of an emergency, local emergency mangers 
are best able to create appropriate response measures to a localized epidemic. They are 
aware of local population concentrations, the number and location of care facilities, and 
the approximate cost of an outbreak in terms of damage caused to local businesses and 
public infrastructure. In order to best defend local citizens from pathogenic health threats 
then, local emergency mangers will need to realize their capabilities in terms of technical 
feasibility, economic constraints, and maintaining sufficient staff numbers, so that the 
federal government is continually informed on how to best support local response 
functions.  
Conclusion 
 In order to justify government emphasis on the potential consequences of 
biological threats, it is important to prove that such threats indeed present just as great a 
risk to society as conventional problems. This thesis poses just that; that with changing 
ecologies and capabilities of scientists around the world, the threat of a newly emerging 
disease epidemic reaching the United States is becoming more and more likely. Even if 
terrorists do not resort to acts of biological warfare, and the environment does not 
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immediately begin to unleash a barrage of pathogenic disasters, it is still generally 
essential to maintain or strengthen current public health measures and the abilities of 
local first responders (Menne & Ebi, 2006, p.59). Becoming better equipped, trained and 
prepared to deal with basic threats to human health can only be of benefit because the 
same comprehensive agenda for preventing emerging infectious diseases through 
research, surveillance, diagnostics, treatments, etc., can be attributed to any source of 
localized health problem (Hamburg et al, 2008, p.2). 
 Overall, the goal is not to attempt to control nature or the adverse actions of 
others, but rather to enhance responsive capabilities in order to reduce human suffering in 
the face of any massive disease infiltration. Local capabilities must thus be strengthened 
first and foremost. In order for there to be an effective response, the federal government 
must work to empower local responders through sufficient funding and resources prior to 
an emergency, rather than dominate relief efforts at the last minute. Local emergency 
mangers must remain in constant communication with federal and state agencies in order 
to ensure that necessary resources are properly allocated in the realm of responding to 
emerging biological threats (Hamburg et al, 2008, p.23).  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
ECOLOGICAL THREATS TO HUMAN HEALTH 
 
“From a long-range historical perspective, the world’s current ecology would be 
characterized as a period of unusually benevolent climatic stability and relative resource 
abundance” (Pirages, 2007, p.1). For the past 10,000 years, this has allowed humanity to 
flourish and create great civilizations, but this pleasant ecological period may quickly be 
reaching its end. It has been predicted that “over the next fifty years, global ecological 
transformations and resulting changes in species occurrences will have enormous impacts 
on biodiversity, ecosystem function, and human health” (Cumming & VanVuuren, 2006, 
p.487).  
Much of this global ecological change can be attributed to a change in the way 
humans now interact with their environment; through man-made technologies and 
infrastructures. Alongside great technological advancements has stemmed a need for 
energy and power. “For one hundred years, a major source of power was derived from 
coal, then for the next hundred years, oil” (Gilpin, 2000, p.265). These two sources of 
energy together produced many of the ecological problems seen today.  
Scientists predict that increasing carbon dioxide emissions from both coal and oil 
over time have induced long-term progressive changes in the world’s ecology, primarily 
global climate. Emitted during fossil fuel combustion and forest clearance, as well as 
from irrigated agriculture, animal husbandry, and oil extraction, anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases have been gradually initiating climatic warming for the last century 
(Watson & McMichael, 2001, p.68). Much of this can be attributed to the fact that, as gas 
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emissions prevent heat from escaping the Earth into space this trapped heat additionally 
melts global ice sheets that cool the Earth by reflecting rays from the sun.  
With these factors combined, scientists have claimed that the atmosphere will 
within the next few decades have heat trapping abilities never before seen by man 
(Linden, 2006, p.118). According to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
in just the last fifty years, “the global average surface temperature has increased by 0.6oC; 
the sea level has risen on average by 10-20 cm, and the temperature of the oceans has 
also increased” (Patz & Kovats, 2002, p.1094). Each of these events has grave 
consequences for humanity and must be looked at as threats to the security of present-day 
societies. 
Impacts of Increased Temperatures on Human Health 
With increases in extreme events like rises in temperature, excess rainfall, 
drought, etc. there are enormous consequences for human health. Thus far, there has been 
a limited sense that global ecological changes and public health are linked, yet it appears 
as though their connection resides in the manifestation of disease. This chapter will focus 
on current global changes and the specific impact they may have upon disease, whether 
brought on by temperature fluctuations themselves, or by their consequential affect on 
disease carriers.  
Increased Temperature and Corresponding Precipitation 
“As temperatures warm the atmosphere can hold more water vapor, leading to 
increasing precipitation” (Menne & Ebi, 2006, p.103). When increased temperature and 
increased rainfall occur simultaneously, especially in an area predisposed to just one of 
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these factors, human biological security can easily become at risk. Many of the risks 
associated with higher rates of precipitation originate from increased flooding.  
Flooding allows disease to proliferate in four major ways. First, rising waters 
force vertebrate hosts of disease, such as mice or rats, into closer contact with humans. 
Second, areas of stagnant water are created, where insect disease carriers such as 
mosquitoes can easily proliferate (Hunter, 2003). Unique to mosquitoes, their eggs 
remain viable and infected in dry areas until the next heavy rainfall produces flooding of 
their habitats, releasing infected mosquito larvae (Lemon et al, 2008, p.20). Third, higher 
rates of humidity and consistent dampness work to increase microbes’ survival rates. 
Recent medical advances have shown that, besides leading to infection, some strains of 
microbes and bacteria play major roles in inducing forms of human cancer, with up to 
eighty-four percent of some cancers being attributable to bacteria (Price-Smith, 2002, 
p.37).  
Finally, rushing flood water has the unique ability to destroy everything in its 
path, from man-made facilities needed for sanitation, hospitals, etc., to nearly all 
vegetation. Environmental damage caused by flooding can thus lead to the depletion of a 
number of particular resources that combat disease, including rare plants needed to 
produce many anti-microbial medicines, as well as the laboratories and hospitals needed 
to create and distribute them (Inouye, 2005, p.211). Additionally, damage to certain 
facilities disrupts sanitation methods, particularly sewers containing human waste, further 
advancing disease spread.  
With sea levels rising due to melting snow and increased precipitation run-off, 
increased rainfall may also have direct consequences on cities located far from flooded 
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regions. Currently, thirteen of the world's twenty mega cities are situated at sea level, and 
with increasing ocean volumes, many of the millions of residents within these cities may 
soon need to seek out places of higher elevation, farther away from shorefronts (Patz et 
al, 2004, p.1095). Not only will inland cities thus be inundated with immigrants, but if 
they lack adequate health infrastructure, they will not be equipped to handle the 
corresponding influx of disease-ridden refugees fleeing from contaminated areas.  
Increased Temperature and Corresponding Dryness 
While the consequences upon disease from flooding are apparent, extreme 
dryness also has negative impacts on the health of humans. Current statistics of global 
warming have shown that “the mean number of days exceeding the health-based ozone 
standard will increase by sixty percent within the next forty years” (Lemon et al, 2008, 
p.93). Such an increase in temperature weakens victims, as it diminishes immune systems 
and thus amplifies susceptibility to bacterial invasions over time.  
Breathing and lung health often deteriorate in drier areas because temperature and 
the formation of ozone at ground level are related. Higher temperatures, combined with 
dryness, tend to produce an increased amount of certain air pollutants, aeroallergens 
spores, and molds (Patz & Kovats, 2002, p.1096). Extreme heat and dryness may thus 
become a serious concern for anyone afflicted with underlying health conditions such as 
obesity, alcoholism, etc., as people who suffer from these chronic conditions often endure 
dehydration, exhaustion, and lung deterioration much more easily.  
Additionally, increased temperatures and subsequent drought have severe impacts 
on areas like the Western portion of the United States, where “even modest decreases in 
rainfall over time could reduce available water for the area by half within forty years” 
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(Linden, 2006, p.253). Millions of people dependent on the region’s source of 
hydroelectric power would consequently experience quite a dilemma. Not only would 
electrical grids fail, but continually diminishing levels of water could make the region 
uninhabitable for the large population it currently sustains.  
Consistent drought further affects the number of Cyanobacterial algae in local 
bodies of water. These blooms occur due to a combination of compacted nutrient 
concentrations, due to a decrease in precipitation, and increased water temperature. As 
surface water warms, bacteria that feeds upon the nutrients experiences rapid growth 
(Hunter, 2003, p.38). Symptoms of being infested with the bacteria include potentially 
fatal bouts of: dermatitis, hepatitis, respiratory symptoms, etc. (Hunter, 2003, p.37). Due 
to increased dryness and decreased water levels in much of the Southern portion of the 
United States, “for the period 1991 to 1998 alone there were 230 general waterborne 
outbreaks reported, affecting an estimated 443,000 people” (Hunter, 2003, p.39).  
As bacterial microorganisms are known to grow with escalating temperature, heat 
waves also lead to increases in food-born infections (Hunter, 2003, 41). Such food 
illnesses can be extremely expensive for many families in terms of both emergency 
treatment costs and time off from work. While “in the United States it is estimated that 
seventy-six million people suffer from some sort of food born illness each year,” this 
number could easily increase with increasing temperatures (Brower, 2003, p.66).  
Whether producing drought or heavy rainfall, increased temperatures in general 
have always had a negative impact upon the health of humans. Generally, higher 
temperatures are positively correlated with higher mortality rates. To this day, in the 
United States, heat waves are more deadly than hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes 
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combined (Lemon et al, 2008, p.90). Many of these deaths result not only from decreases 
in heart and lung function, but also from overall increases in the natural pathogens that 
flourish during periods of increased heat.  
Impacts of Ecological Shifts on Vector Populations 
Climatic shifts are essential to the propagation of both vectors and their diseases. 
Recent studies have shown that “temperature and humidity are the two most important 
climatic factors for vectors’ survival, development, and biting activity” (Menne & Ebi, 
2006, p.139). As temperatures have shifted over the last few decades, “the distribution 
ranges of both vectors and the pathogens they carry have extended northwards and into 
higher altitudes,” brining many new diseases once confined to tropical regions, into the 
United States (Menne & Ebi, 2006, p.141). Regarding changes in human health therefore, 
perhaps the first effects of ecological change will be manifested through changes in 
vector distributions.  
Vectors are defined as “the transmitters of disease-causing organisms; that is, they 
carry pathogens from one host to another” (Lemon et al, 2008, p.1). Vectors thus come in 
the form of mosquitoes, ticks, fleas, etc., all specimens that use the blood of another host 
or their own saliva to transfer agents. “Nearly half of the world’s population is currently 
infected with at least one type of vector-born pathogen, with Malaria accounting for the 
most deaths by far of any human vector-born disease” (Lemon et al, 2008, p.4).  
Transmitted by mosquitoes, Malaria may continue to spread. It has been proven 
that “increasing temperature only four degrees, could increase the number of adult 
mosquitoes by forty-five percent” the world over (Lemon et al, 2008, p.142). 
Dangerously, in the United Sates, after decades of decline in mosquito-born diseases, 
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many training programs within the realm of vector biology and entomology were 
dismantled. Similarly, funding was cut for programs within academic institutions that 
produce experts in these fields. As such, “no new public health insecticides for adult 
mosquitoes have been developed in the United States for more than thirty years” (Lemon 
et al, 2008, p.158). Without sufficient research and development in the field, the United 
States has thus become quite vulnerable to epidemics carried by ever-increasing mosquito 
populations.  
West Nile Virus in the United States  
 West Nile Virus (WNV) is a principal disease carried by mosquitoes. Within the 
United States, WNV has been moving rapidly westward from the East coast for the last 
three years. Much of this shift can be attributed to the fact that, as of late, even the dry 
portion of the country has been transformed into an area filled with golf courses, 
swimming pools, reservoirs, etc. These areas were all created for human comfort and 
enjoyment, yet they have also allowed for an artificial humidity that has been ideal for 
disease vectors like mosquitoes to propagate.  
WNV has long lasting effects often resulting in hospitalization with symptoms 
that can last months. Symptoms of the virus include persistent, disabling neurological 
tremors and movement disorders, as well as difficulty with memory and concentration. In 
2002, “it caused the largest epidemic of Meningoencephalitis in U.S. history, with nearly 
3,000 cases of neurological disease and 284 deaths” (Lemon et al, 2008, pp. 49,169). 
Since many symptoms do not immediately reveal themselves, costly screening 
procedures through blood tests has become necessary, further making WNV an extremely 
expensive disease for the U.S. to control.  
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Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome in the Western United States  
 Changes in temperature also have direct impacts on plant ecologies that determine 
which types of animals and potential disease hosts exist in which areas. As previously 
stated, in recent years climate changes have specifically produced periods of drought in 
the Southern portion of the United States. These droughts have led to a decline in 
vegetation that consequently has suppressed populations of larger animals that feed upon 
smaller species.  
In the case of the Four Corners region of the United States, where the borders of 
Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet, decreases in numbers of predator 
animals have in the past led to an explosion of rodent populations. In 1993, an outbreak 
of Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome was able to transpire due to a combination of: 
decreases in vegetation and larger animals, corresponding increases in small rodent 
populations, and unusually heavy El Nino rains. These heavy rains forced a migration of 
local rodents into covered areas containing houses, buildings, etc. inadvertently bringing 
them into closer contact with humans.  
Originating in the local rodents’ feces, Hantavirus entered through the respiratory 
tract causing death as a result of uremia, shock, and pulmonary edema. During the 1993 
outbreak, the mortality rate reached over forty percent within the United States, the 
highest mortality rate ever reported for Hantavirus (Menne & Ebi, 2006, pp.244-245). 
Clearly, much of this occurred due to changes in local ecologies 
Ticks as Vectors of Disease in the United States  
Changing ecologies have also affected populations of white-tailed deer in the 
United States by facilitating ideal breeding climates for their ticks. At very broad scales, 
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rainfall and temperature are the primary determinants of tick species ranges (Cumming & 
VanVuuren, 2006, p.490). Problematic for humans, ticks are vectors of a wide range of 
human and livestock diseases including Lyme disease, tick-born encephalitis, and Q 
fever. Within the United States, cases of Lyme disease are now reported between 15,000 
and 20,000 times each year (Menne & Ebi, 2006, p.157). Out of fear of obtaining certain 
tick diseases, people have restricted their use of many revenue-generating activities such 
as camping and hunting. Fiscally, tick pathogens have thus had severe impacts on certain 
recreational industries, as well as the beef, poultry and milk industries due to animal 
husbandry contamination (Cumming & VanVuuren, 2006, p.493).  
Impacts of Ecological Changes on Governments 
Today’s civilizations are much more vulnerable to ecological shocks than those of 
the past. Through practices of free trade and a greatly increased reliance on imports and 
exports, nations have become interdependent, allowing most industrialized societies to 
suffer from food shortages even if their own countries are not directly impacted. Current 
civilizations have also built strong roots in many countries, becoming fixed to their 
locales in the form of large infrastructures, electrical grids, extensive piping, etc. This 
makes them much more vulnerable to unpredictable environmental shifts than their 
predecessors, who could easily relocate with weather fluctuations (Linden, 2006, p.40).  
In terms of adaptation, “climate does not typically shift from consistently warm to 
consistently cold, but transitions are typified by flickering, when climate rapidly shifts 
back and forth before settling into a new state” (Linden, 2006, p.76). It is these shifts that 
can confuse and undermine governments by making efficient responses difficult to both 
predict and carry out. With such rapid ecological changes, societies become 
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overwhelmed by the simultaneous release of microbes, withering of crops, and 
devastating changes in weather.  
Adaptation in fact becomes impossible for all biological specimens when 
stretches of extreme warmth or cold are suddenly punctuated by bouts of the opposite. 
“When precipitation patterns and temperatures change, creatures in the affected 
ecosystem must adapt. Typically, the organisms that adapt the fastest are those that have 
short generations and many offspring,” however, particularly microbes, not humans 
(Linden, 2006, p.61).  
Conclusion 
On this planet all ecosystems are connected. In fact, a mere five components 
interact to produce the climate of a location: atmosphere, bodies of water, the amount of 
snow and ice, the extent of land surface, and the size of flora and fauna (Menne & Ebi, 
2006, p.9). So as increasing temperatures decrease snow and ice packs, which further 
facilitates warming, they also affect vegetative cover, soil concentrations, oxygen levels, 
rainfall, river flow, species occurrence, etc.  
Despite the fact that large ecological shifts have occurred on Earth before, the 
recent rise in temperature has occurred at a much quicker pace than it has for at least the 
previous thousand years. Past studies of the Earth have proven that the planet often 
reaches thresholds. Once we cross an ecological threshold our ecosystem will reach a 
state where its resilience has been greatly reduced and a final small push can send the 
environment into a rapid transition towards a new equilibrium (Homer-Dixon, 1999, 
p.38). 
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While it is impossible to know exactly what consequences this new equilibrium 
will have upon humanity, one must only look at past ecological swings to see their 
potential impact. Over the past one hundred years, the weather event known as El Nino 
has led to the deaths of three times as many people as the Black Death. Many of these 
deaths occurred due to great human catastrophes such as the Dust Bowl in the United 
States, and the Great Potato Famine of Ireland. From 1997 to 1998 alone El Nino further 
inflicted about $100 billion in damage (Linden, 2006, pp. 50,182). While these costs have 
been severe, future ecological catastrophes may occur on a much larger scale and 
continue for extended periods of time, making the success of many human societies 
nearly unimaginable.  
Drastic environmental shifts have already begun. Hurricanes have doubled in 
intensity due to changes in ocean temperatures, and overall storm patterns have begun to 
alter. On December 7, 2004, Tropical Storm Odette hit the Dominican Republic, the first 
recorded tropical storm to hit the Caribbean in December. That same day a monster 
snowstorm paralyzed the Northeastern region of the United States. Prior to this, two 
storms with hurricane-force winds, one cold and one warm, pummeling contiguous 
regions on the same day had been unheard of. The same year was also recorded as having 
the earliest and latest tropical storm activity on record (Linden, 2006, p.249).  
Overall, 1,500 people die each hour from infectious ailments, and by one estimate 
“there are at least 5,000 types of viruses and more than 300,000 species of bacteria that 
challenge human beings today” (Brower, 2003, p.13).  Dangerously, many of these 
species are able to replicate and evolve billions of times in a human generation. In order 
to lessen the potential health disaster awaiting many societies it is thus important for 
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preemptive policies to be enacted. As Drs. Menne and Ebi state in the World Health 
Organization’s 2006 report entitled Climate Change and Adaptation Strategies for 
Human Health, “outcomes regarding health in this changing world will depend on social 
systems; the characteristics of the population as well as the prevention measures and 
actions in place to reduce the burden” (p.2).  
Perhaps the best governmental defense is ensuring that the country has sufficient 
emergency response capabilities. Quality and availability of trained first responders is 
crucial, and adaptations to the health hazard posed by global climate change will need to 
be both proactive and reactive (Watson and McMichael, 2001, p.71). Broad policy 
approaches and responses regarding ecological changes and human health must become 
part of general government discourse, and will thus become a primary topic discussed in 
later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
MAN-MADE THREATS TO HUMAN HEALTH 
 
 Along with advancements in modern society, an essential problem has appeared. 
“Material progress has advanced rapidly while the social and political background has 
remained beset by religious hatred, economic inequalities, and fearing one’s neighbors” 
(Gilpin, 2000, p.89). This social and political lag has created great dangers for 
contemporary societies because in a climate of terror and hate, any technology used for 
good could equally be used to harm.  
Globalization as a Man-Made Threat to Human Health 
 
With modern advancements in transportation organisms now have the potential of 
traveling around the world in a matter of days, easily facilitating the movement of genetic 
material from one region to another. While this genetic material may take numerous 
forms, any transferred material that is nonnative to an ecosystem, “whose introduction 
causes or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human health” is 
referred to as an invasive species (Howard et al, 2006, p.43).  
Currently, invasive species have taken root in nearly every corner of the globe and 
their impact is apparent. Introduced species of many types cost industries and public 
facilities thousands of dollars each day. They alter things like food production, the 
provision of water, the rate and nature of regeneration of woodlands, and the developing 
and maintaining of infrastructures. In the United States alone, control of invasive species 
costs over $138 billion per year due to these circumstances (Cumming & VanVuuren, 
2006, pp. 487, 492).  
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Invasive Species and the U.S. Agricultural Market 
 
For the entire human race, “a mere seven species – corn, rice, wheat, barley, 
cassava, potato, and sweet potato – provide three-quarters of all nutrition, and almost all 
protein from domesticated animals comes from just nine groups” (Tobin, 1990, p.13). 
Such an extraordinary reliance on so few species creates a high vulnerability to the 
effects of infiltrating pests and crop disease. Specifically due to trade and modern crop 
specialization, if agriculture is harmed on any region of the Earth, many others will also 
be affected. As an example, any invasive species that negatively impacted the Great 
Plains region of the United States would be analogous to a major global disaster because 
the U.S. exports the greater part of the world’s grain (Patz & Kovats, 2002, p.1097).  
Although it may not seem so, agriculture is just as essential to the United States as 
it is to less industrialized nations. Even though less than three percent of the population 
works on a farm, one in eight people in the U.S. work in an occupation that is directly 
supported by food production (Chalk, 2004, p.1). Allied industries include: suppliers, 
transporters, distributors, restaurants, etc., so that the fiscal downstream affect of a major 
act of disruption upon the food industry would be extremely financially detrimental. “In 
2002 food production constituted thirteen percent of the U.S. gross domestic product, 
generating cash receipts in excess of $991 billion. With agriculture’s share of produce 
sold overseas more than doubling that of other U.S. industries, the agricultural sector is 
also a major component in the U.S. balance of trade” (Chalk, 2004, p.4).  
Goods may now become infested with foreign pathogens during the many steps of 
global trade; “through harvesting, storage, processing, and transport,” yet there remains a 
lack of resources for quickly identifying, containing, and eradicating pathogenic 
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infiltrations in the United States (Kawachi & Wamala, 2007, p.21). Even with the threat 
of invading genetic material, “most homeland defense planning and funding is focused 
around the protection of urban populations and infrastructure, while the safeguarding of 
agricultural areas does not receive much consideration” (Armstrong, 2002, p.5). In fact in 
2002, the U.S. National Research Council concluded that the country has inadequate 
plans for dealing with any invasion upon the agricultural sector (Madden & Wheelis, 
2003, p.155). 
According to Robert Robinson, managing director of Natural Resources and the 
Environment at the U.S. General Accounting Office, “biological security and surveillance 
at many U.S. food processing and rendering plants generally remain inadequate, formal 
state and federal inspections of these sites are rudimentary, and current oversight of 
production is inconsistent” (Chalk, 2004, p.34). According to the Committee on 
International Science, Engineering, and Technology, “only about one percent of goods 
entering the United States are screened at their point of disembarkation,” and notification 
requirements as described by the Public Health Service Act and Foreign Quarantine 
Regulations do not cover animals, insects, or any specimen arriving by automobile 
(Brower, 2003, p.65). Through each of these examples, it seems apparent that agriculture 
in the United States remains extremely vulnerable to pathogenic invasion. 
Furthermore, since agriculture is typically grown in rural areas, any invasive 
pathogen could easily spread without notice. Besides the fact that isolated areas are less 
easily accessed by federal intervention, most rural facilities also lack the use of e-mail or 
other types of technology needed to quickly inform both the CDC and neighboring 
counties of an outbreak. Even if a destructive invasive species was caught in a timely 
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manner, “many small-scale agricultural operations do not keep accurate records of their 
distribution network,” making it nearly impossible to trace any contaminated items back 
to their original source of production (Chalk, 2004, p.11).  
Intentional Attacks against U.S. Agriculture 
“The United States has the largest amount of arable land per capita of any country 
in the world, with 1.73 acres versus 0.99 for other developed countries, and only 0.49 in 
the developing world” (Armstrong, 2002, p.2). The country thus possesses an enormous 
expanse of land that it must protect from outside threats. Besides being wary of the 
unintentional infiltration of biological specimens through trade and travel, over recent 
years it has become likely that certain groups may benefit from intentionally infecting 
agriculture within the United States, as any contaminated food can either directly sicken 
the public, or lead to sick and dying animals and crops (Howard et al, 2006, p.206).  
Agriculture is in fact an extremely attractive target for a multitude of reasons. 
First, crops are grown over large areas and thus cannot be protected in a military sense. 
Second, as previously stated, they are often poorly monitored. Third, the majority of plant 
diseases have not been eradicated, so it is relatively easy for groups to obtain diseased 
plants to culture and release amongst healthy yields. Fourth, the database of genetic 
fingerprints for plant pathogens is not very extensive, so determining the origin of an 
introduced pathogen would be a slow process when attempting to seize a perpetrator 
(Madden & Wheelis, 2003, p.157, 165).  
Besides thwarting trade and perhaps affecting jobs, any attack that would cripple 
an agricultural industry could additionally result in a heightened demand and an 
associated price increase for specific products. “An astute perpetrator could take 
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advantage of these market dynamics by investing in certain stocks before carrying out an 
assault” (Chalk, 2004, p.27). This fact alone may provide further incentive for some to 
intentionally introduce invasive species, thus categorizing an assault on crops as both 
biological and economic warfare.  
Politically, for those groups looking to negotiate some sort of deal with the United 
States, destroying crops en masse seems a rational solution. Rather than eliciting the 
aggressive retaliation that would occur if civilians were murdered, attacking agriculture 
could sufficiently scare U.S. leaders into bargaining. Historical evidence reveals that 
“countries serious about developing a military capability to wage biological warfare 
usually include an anti-crop capability as part of their program” perhaps for this very 
reason (Madden & Wheelis, 2003, p.162).  
Table 1 in Appendix C reveals that anti-crop pathogens have long been utilized by 
state-sponsored militaries. Iraq in fact invested a great deal of effort on a fungal strain 
with crop destroying potential known as wheat cover smut (Lederberg, 1999, p.139). Al-
Qaeda has also repeatedly stated its intention to conduct economic warfare against the 
United States through its ability to export to the rest of the world. Taking all this into 
account, there is thus a great likelihood that U.S. agriculture could be attacked in the near 
future.  
Threat of Biological Weapons 
 
Whenever discussing the possibility of biological terrorism, it is first important to 
define the parts that compose a biological attack. First, a biological agent must be used. A 
biological agent is defined as any “microorganism, virus, or infectious substance capable 
of causing deleterious changes in the environment; damaging food or water supplies; or 
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causing diseases in humans, animals, plants, or other living organisms” (Lederberg, 1999, 
p.85). Second is the use of the actual biological weapon. According to the Department of 
Defense’s criteria, a biological weapon is composed of a biological agent, a container that 
keeps the agent intact and virulent during transmission, a method of delivery, and a 
device to disperse the agent onto the target population.  
As of now the casualties from biological warfare are immensely disturbing to 
imagine, leading many United States officials to rely on the hope that such weapons will 
never be utilized. Unfortunately, biological weapons have been used to incite acts of 
terror and mass casualties for hundreds of years. “More than two millennia ago archers 
dipped arrowheads in manure and rotting corpses to increase the deadliness of their 
weapons and plague-ridden bodies were hurled over the walls of enemy cities” (Miller et 
al, 2002, p.37). More recently, during the colonization of the United States, smallpox was 
inadvertently utilized as a biological weapon to thin the Native American population.  
Veterinary pathogens have also been used as biological weapons, as many 
diseases that infect animals are unrecognizable to human cells and are thus unable to 
infect the humans who handle them. As just one example, during the Second World War, 
Germany developed a biological weapons program that infected the livestock of Allied 
Forces with anthrax (Lederberg, 1999, p.19). This proved beneficial as it often went 
unnoticed, and as stated earlier, any attack upon animal or agricultural yields often has 
direct impacts upon a country’s economy.  
Another main reason biological agents often become the weapon of choice against 
enemies is the fact that outbreaks of disease are often attributable to natural occurrences. 
Biological warfare against humans is perhaps more menacing than any other form of 
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hostile attack as it “does not announce itself with a large explosion…one cannot smell, 
taste, or see biological agents…[and] the attack is not known until sick patients begin 
arriving in hospitals and doctor’s offices sometimes days after initial exposure” (Frist, 
2002, p.1). These facts make such an attack extremely difficult to both monitor and 
mitigate. Infectious disease agents in general often possess long incubation periods that 
further permit the operatives responsible to evacuate a region before a case is even 
diagnosed (Miller et al, 2002, p.60). 
Overall, the use of pathogens and disease to incite terror is clearly not a low-
probability occurrence. The tendency for terrorists to move into new areas of violence 
when current ones no longer achieve the same amount of publicity and chaos makes 
biological weapons extremely susceptible to use, especially now that the pattern of many 
terrorist groups has been to murder large numbers of civilians indiscriminately 
(Lederberg, 1999, p.236). Much of this can be attributed to the apocalyptic nature of 
many religiously-based terrorist groups. As of now, it is unlikely that any determined 
perpetrator will be deterred by legal restraints, and many biological agents have remained 
uncontrolled and extremely accessible to those interested.  
Who is Likely to Resort to the use of Biological Weapons? 
While biological warfare can be utilized by individual nations, it is much more 
probable that independent groups will resort to such methods. As these groups do not 
have the means to engage in conventional war, they are much more likely to try 
alternative, asymmetrical techniques (Lederberg, 1999, p.112). Small groups of terrorists 
are also likely to resort to biological weapons use because the cost of disseminating a 
biological agent is much less than that associated with the development of nuclear or 
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chemical weapons, yet lethality can be just as high (Lederberg, 1999, p.110). In fact, by 
combining a biological attack with a standard explosive attack of any sort, the blend of 
mass casualties and panic could cause an extraordinary amount of injuries and death, 
especially in an unprepared region. 
According to numerous security policy analysts, groups capable of resorting to 
biological weapons are comprised of: those individuals with the motivation and lack of 
moral constraints, those with the technical expertise, and those with a charismatic leader 
able to carry out initiatives with order and passion. Table 2 in Appendix C reveals exactly 
how many non-state actors in the Twentieth Century have reverted to the use of 
biological terrorism. A vast majority of these cases took place post 1970. 
Non-State Actors  
According to Gordon Oehler, former director of the U.S. intelligence 
community’s Nonproliferation Center, “non-state actors worldwide are increasingly 
learning how to manufacture chemical and biological agents,” and it is not at all difficult 
to do so (Lederberg, 1999, p.284). As an example, it has been stated that an individual 
could mount a germ attack using a blender, cheesecloth, a garden sprayer, and some 
widely available hospital supplies (Miller et al, 2002, p.163). Once a certain strain of 
bacteria is obtained, the mixture could be blended, filtered through the cloth, and then 
sprayed through the air intakes of any large building. Table 3 in Appendix C reveals just 
how often such unconventional methods of pathogen spread have been utilized. In terms 
of non-state terrorism, there are often two types of terrorist groups that dominate 
discussion: political and religious.  
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Religiously Motivated Actors 
Often believing that attacks enacted by them are divinely sanctioned, the use of 
naturally occurring disease pathogens is easily justified by religious terrorist groups. It 
has in fact been predicted that religious terrorists are much more prone to biological 
warfare because they are often: less interested in public opinion, less deterred by threats 
of punishment, and are not concerned with alienating outsiders. This makes them more 
likely to employ weapons and attack targets that most people would consider 
unthinkable.  
In today’s time, religiously motivated terrorists are seeking to wipe out their 
enemy, and hence, often see little problem with resorting to weapons of mass destruction. 
Furthermore, many of these groups are apocalyptic in nature and dangerously suicidal, 
believing that they will be rewarded for their actions in the next life. While there is no 
abundance of such religious terrorist groups, they are growing in numbers. “In 1968, 
none of the eleven international terrorist groups could be characterized as religious in 
nature, yet by 1995, forty-two percent of the fifty-eight known groups were, and they 
were responsible for over half of the fatalities regarding terrorist incidents” (Lederberg, 
1999, p.294). 
One example of an extremist religious group is Aum Shinrikyo, residing in Japan. 
In the mid nineties this group unleashed an attack with Sarin nerve gas upon civilians in a 
Tokyo subway. A dozen people were killed and thousands injured by the onslaught 
(Miller et al, 2002, p.152). Although this was a chemical attack, reports later revealed 
that the Aum Shinrikyo sect had originally planned to develop biological weapons.  
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In 1992, the group sent a team to the former Zaire to assist in the treatment of 
Ebola victims as a cover for their real goal, to find a sample of Ebola virus to take back to 
Japan for culturing (Lederberg, 1999, p.119). Japanese intelligence also discovered a 
1989 arrangement between members of the religious cult and Iraqi secret service 
members regarding trading information about biological warfare (Lederberg, 1999, 
p.305). Frighteningly, the United States had no information about this group prior to the 
attack, even though the cult had published a direct statement threatening then president 
Clinton.  
More recently, another religiously motivated act of unconventional terrorism took 
place on U.S. soil. In late 2001, numerous anthrax laced letters were mailed to U.S. 
Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, the Governor of New York, as well as a 
number of media leaders. Ending in the phrase, “Allah is great,” each of these letters was 
apparently religiously tied. 
 Despite the fact that only a few people were targeted, the anthrax attacks soon 
became a regional disaster. Much of this can be attributed to the rarity of the pathogen. At 
the time of the anthrax attacks, the CDC “lacked a thorough compilation of relevant 
scientific literature and of outside experts who could be consulted about the agent” 
(Johnstone, 2008, p.95). The CDC also experienced a variety of problems processing the 
large amounts of information arriving from multiple sources regarding the incidents. 
Treated at first as natural occurrences, the federal government was not properly alerted to 
the cases, and as a result “mail handlers inadvertently exposed to the agent were 
identified only after it was too late for effective treatment” (Brower, 2003, p.95). 
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Once CDC experts finally became well versed on the particular effects of anthrax, 
state and local health authorities reported difficulties in providing proper diagnosis and 
treatment information to regional healthcare providers due to a wide variety of 
communication capabilities (Johnstone, 2008, p.103). State and local public health 
officials later reported that their resources were seriously strained by the anthrax attacks 
and they might not have been able to manage had the crisis lasted longer (Johnstone, 
2008, p.103). Eventually, “twenty-two individuals were diagnosed with either confirmed 
or suspected anthrax infections, evenly split between the coetaneous and inhalation 
forms” (Johnstone, 2008, p.17). Clearly, if the spores had been even more haphazardly 
distributed, perhaps aerosolized through a vent in a large building, then many more 
people would have been affected.  
Religiously motivated acts of terrorism are particularly difficult to respond to. 
Dispersed throughout the globe there is no longer a unified face of terrorist actors, nor a 
unified approach to weaponization. For example, besides residing in the Middle East, 
Islamic terrorist groups can now be found in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines 
(Howard et al, 2006, p.8). Regarding biological attacks by Islamic groups in particular, 
the eleventh volume of Al Qaeda’s Encyclopedia of Jihad is devoted to both chemical 
and biological weapons (Kellman, 2007, p.1). Documents and computer hard drives 
seized by the FBI have further solidified that the acquisition, production, and use of 
biological weapons by Al Qaeda is legitimately being discussed.  
Politically Motivated Actors  
Unlike religious terrorists, political terrorist groups do not typically seek to inflict 
mass casualties (Lederberg, 1999, p.289). Instead, they have often resorted to hostage 
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taking, hijacking, small-scale bombs, and assassinations, primarily for media coverage. 
Their goal is often to weaken public confidence in government by making citizens feel 
insecure in their own countries. Within the United States this has not been the case, 
however. In 1984 a cult by the name of Rajneeshee was able to obtain dangerous 
pathogens from an American germ bank which they then unleashed upon a small Oregon 
town.  
By placing salmonella in restaurant coffee creamers, blue-cheese dressing, and 
sometimes even over fruits and vegetables in salad bars, the Rajneeshee group hoped to 
make local residents too sick to vote in elections in order to gain political clout. Seven 
hundred and fifty-one people, ranging in age from newborn to eighty-seven years became 
ill in two separate waves. Their symptoms included: diarrhea, fever, chills, headache, 
nausea, vomiting, and other basic food poisoning ailments.  
Local physicians and medical authorities had to determine quickly if this was a 
natural outbreak or deliberate contamination. They were able to decipher that: since there 
was no single provider or distributor to any of the restaurants impacted, all facilities 
appeared to maintain proper sanitation practices, and plasmid analysis identified a single 
outbreak strain, that in fact the town was not experiencing the remote possibility of 
independent, simultaneous outbreaks (Lederberg, 1999, p.181).This attack became “the 
first large-scale use of germs on American soil,” and the ease in which the pathogens 
were ordered is perhaps most frightening (Miller et al, 2002, p.32).  
Rajneeshee members were able to obtain the S. Typhimurium pathogen from a 
commercial supplier of biologic products. Due to the small size of the group’s clandestine 
lab, and the lab’s status as a medical corporation, they were able to purchase germs 
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legally without having to register with the state. When public health officials realized 
how easily the Rajneeshees had spread the disease, it became apparent that America was 
not prepared to deal with a domestic biological attack.  
It has since been learned that the public is best protected from an epidemic when 
health care professionals and laboratories cooperate early with local and state health 
departments regarding suspicious and unusual disease clusters (Lederberg, 1999, p.184). 
Congress has also since passed a law that imposes tougher rules regarding the domestic 
transfer of pathogens (Miller et al, 2002, p.197). Now, U.S. laboratories that maintain 
germ collections have to register and submit to federal inspections. This way, vials of 
hazardous bacteria can no longer be purchased without government surveillance.  
Another example of a domestic biological terrorist incident occurred in 1998, 
when an individual associated with right wing extremist activities attempted to procure 
and produce a biological weapon. A man by the name of Larry Wayne Harris, linked to 
the Aryan Nations, was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada for possession and plotting to use 
vials of Pasteurella pestis while spewing anti-government remarks. Pasteurella pestis is 
the biological agent also known as the plague. While the plague pathogen often attacks 
lymphatic glands, potentially causing septicemia, it can and has often mutated into a 
violent and contagious lung infection. In fact “pneumonic plague” is a death sentence to 
anyone within a range of an infected individual’s coughing or breathing range, with a one 
hundred percent expectation of death within two days (Lederberg, 1999, p.14).  
Las Vegas has long been on the “top ten list” of likely U.S. cities to be targeted by 
a terrorist attack. Besides right wing extremists, hijackers from the 9/11 event were said 
to have used Las Vegas as a meeting ground for plotting their strategy. In the case of 
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Harris, a mass pandemic could have easily ensued from his possession of the plague 
virus, but potential disaster was averted primarily due to the alert recognition and 
intervention of local Las Vegas authorities.  
Overall, non-state actors have proven to be a much more difficult threat to combat 
than threats from militarized nations. As former CIA Director James Woolsey states, “we 
have slain a large dragon, but are now finding ourselves living in a jungle with a 
bewildering number of poisonous snakes. In many ways, the dragon was easier to keep 
track of” (Brower, 2003, p.2).  
Non-State Actors and Advancements in Biological Technologies  
There are certain points of view that have remained prevalent among policy 
circles serving to dismiss biological terrorism as nothing more than theoretical. Some 
scholars in the political community have thus far believed that the science of producing 
enough organisms and dispersing them is so difficult, that it is out of reach for any 
uneducated actor (Rizzo, 1989, p.498). Contrary to popular belief, however, criminals 
against the state often do not come from the ranks of the poor and many are university 
graduates, fully conscious of their actions and capable of using pathogens to their 
advantage (Howard et al, 2006, p.61). Table 4 in Appendix C exemplifies this fact.  
Biological terrorism has in fact become a plausible act of warfare recently, 
especially with the advent of the internet. Political terrorists especially have often stated 
that individuals should have parity with large, powerful nations, and the internet has 
provided them with just such methods of power and control. Dissemination of 
information regarding how to create and disperse certain weapons has become prolific on 
the internet, as well as those who utilize such mass communication for social 
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manipulation. In today’s world, “global communications provide a ready and effective 
means of dissemination models of marginalization and violent ideas of cultural 
resistance” (Nolutshungu, 1996, p.299).  
Through the expansion of the internet, it has become apparent that knowledge 
regarding bacteria, viruses, chemicals, etc. has become inexhaustible. From a security 
perspective, if someone with expertise in the area were looking to remain undetected 
while he or she seeks to obtain specific pathogens for the purpose of causing harm, the 
“sequence information that defines the genomes encoding many pathogens is readily 
available online” (Gostin, 1997, p.687). While manipulation of genetic material by these 
methods is labor intensive, as well as extremely hazardous, such work can be done in 
medium-sized laboratories.  
This extended reach of members within certain hostile groups can have large 
impacts on any society, especially within the United States where many diverse groups 
reside. Nations like the United States may find it difficult to monitor and remain 
responsive to all sections of their population (Nolutshungu, 1996, p.2). For this reason, 
the U.S. must remain alert to the fact that there will reside marginal populations who 
suffer particular problems of insecurity within the country. These marginal people may 
turn to the internet, searching for groups that advocate acts of terror and violence.  
Marginal Populations 
Marginal populations can be defined as “distinguishable minorities within states 
whose integration into society is markedly incomplete, so that their participation is 
partial, intermittent, or subject to special qualifications” (Nolutshungu, 1996, p.17). 
Particularly problematic for ethnically diverse countries such as the United States is the 
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fact that preserving national security often includes looking at marginal groups with more 
scrutiny (Nolutshungu, 1996, p.13). Such an act can produce a cyclical effect; as 
governments become openly suspicious of marginal groups during periods of fear or 
crises, they in fact continue to marginalize these groups, forcing them to turn inward.  
Currently, the United States is finding itself in an economic crisis that can easily 
lead marginal groups to become ostracized. As competition for scarce monetary resources 
in the form of employment increases, marginal groups may become more harshly 
scrutinized and prevented from gaining access to standard methods of upward social 
mobility (Nolutshungu, 1996, p.60). Since marginal populations tend to possess less 
power and money, they usually suffer graver consequences during hard times (Homer-
Dixon, 1999, p.15).  
Regarding biological terrorism it is important to mention marginal populations 
because persistent feelings of segregation from society may reinforce marginal group ties. 
Many will thus turn to strong group leaders in order to gain a sense of security. 
Unfortunately, this typically only creates greater insecurity, as it makes them a target of 
suspicion, especially if a few members of the larger group seek out violent means to gain 
representation.  
Violence often arises when government legitimacy is undermined out of an 
inability to respond to both fiscal and environmental stresses. Those who reside in 
societies like the United States where they have been led to believe that they have a right 
to success and wealth may be even more prone to violence. This is especially true as 
groups begin to feel relative deprivation, “where they perceive a widening gap between 
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the level of satisfaction they have achieved and what they believe they deserve” (Homer-
Dixon, 1999, p.136). 
State-Sponsored Actors 
While the above scenario raises the potential for terrorism that stems from 
domestic sources, there has recently been a resurgence of state sponsorship of terrorism, 
with foreign governments providing things like training, safe haven, and financial and 
scientific assistance to terrorist groups (Lederberg, 1999, p.236). Legitimate use of 
biological weapons by state actors has been an issue for decades. During World War II, 
“Japan alone is said to have caused nearly a quarter of a million casualties using plague, 
cholera, and epidemic hemorrhagic fever as biological weapons in China” (Kellman, 
2007, p.57). More recently, in the late 1980s, several medium-sized nations including 
regional aggressors such as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran pursued major 
weapons programs that incorporated biological arms (Lederberg, 1999, p.83).  
Iraq’s Biological Weapons Program  
Regarding Iraq, “it would take the United Nations team nearly four years and 
countless trips to piece together what the CIA had figured out by the fall of 1991,” that 
Salman Pak, just south of Baghdad was just one of many Iraqi centers for biological 
warfare research and development (Miller et al, 2002, p.131). By the mid-1990s, Iraq 
admitted to having produced “19,000L of concentrated botulinum toxin, of which 
10,000L were loaded into military weapons. This constitutes approximately three times 
the amount needed to kill the entire current human population by inhalation” (Arnon et 
al, 2001, p.1059). In 1990, Iraq deployed specially designed missiles with a 600-km 
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range; thirteen of these were filled with botulinum toxin, ten with aflatoxin, and two with 
anthrax spores” (Arnon et al, 2001, p.1060). 
Botulinum toxin, which is a primary agent for weaponization, is the most toxic 
compound known. With an estimated toxic dose of only 0.001 pg/kg of body weight, 
botulinum is 100,000 times more toxic than Sarin nerve gas (Lederberg, 1999, p.72). 
Exposure to botulinum toxin often results in paralysis, leading those exposed to appear 
comatose within twelve to seventy-two hours of exposure. Victims experience difficulty 
speaking and swallowing, with death often occurring from a lack of protective gag reflex 
functioning, resulting in airway obstruction. It is an ideal biological weapon as it is 
“easily produced and transported, colorless, odorless, and tasteless, and prolonged care is 
needed following contamination” (Arnon et al, 2001, p.1064). Placing a large burden on 
the health care system, as well as employers of those infected, recovery from the toxin 
can take months as the brain attempts to repair itself.  
Anthrax, meanwhile is an ideal candidate for biological weaponization as it can 
enter the human body through multiple pathways, attacking the lungs when inhaled, 
burrowing into the digestive tract of those who eat contaminated meat, or seeping into the 
skin through sores or cuts. “Anthrax bacteria can also be induced to form microscopic 
spores that have a tough outer coat, rendering them resistant to environmental stresses 
such as heat, drying, and sunlight” (Lederberg, 1999, p.286). “Anthrax, if left untreated, 
kills nearly every infected person – a very high rate of mortality, even compared with 
plague and most other pathogens” (Miller et al, 2002, p.42).  
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The Soviet Biological Weapons Program  
It is now known that “the Soviet program for germ warfare began in the 1920s, 
and grew steadily into one of the largest of the modern era” (Davis, 1999, p.49). 
Suspicions were first raised when an explosion at a secret military base sent a cloud of 
deadly microbes wafting over a nearby village (Davis, 1999, p.76). This cloud was 
eventually proven to be anthrax and “at least seventy-seven cases and sixty-six deaths 
resulted, constituting the largest epidemic of inhalation anthrax in history” (Lederberg, 
1999, p.31).  
In 1992, after reporting for years that epidemics in the region were due to 
ingestion of contaminated meat, Boris Yeltsin finally admitted that the military facility in 
the town of Sverdlovsk was in fact part of an offensive biological weapons program. 
Unfortunately, the extent of activities being conducted at the compound was never 
discovered, nor what caused the accidental release of anthrax over the village. Perhaps 
the most dangerous result of the Soviet biological weapons program, however, was the 
defection of biological weapons scientists from the facility.  
U.S. officials have long feared that the deteriorating state of the former Soviet 
germ warfare centers would allow their secrets and scientists to fall into dangerous hands 
(Davis, 1999, p.140).  “Never before had the collapse of an empire left behind tens of 
thousands of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the scientists who knew 
how to make them,” open to exploitation (Miller et al, 2002, p.191). As of now, it appears 
that many of the defectors fled to the Middle and Far Eastern portions of the globe.  
Disturbingly, since the Biological Weapons Convention to prohibit the development, 
stockpiling, and production of such weapons went into force in 1975, “the number of 
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countries known to have or suspected of having biological weapons capability has 
doubled worldwide” (Lederberg, 1999, 95).  
State-Sponsored Actors and Advancements in Biological Technologies 
Germs are all around us, with those found in nature being deadly enough, but now 
through the use of biotechnologies, governments are creating biological weapons that 
have the potential of being much more destructive. Biotechnology refers to “any 
technological application used to make or modify products for explicit human use” and in 
the last forty years or so it has become one of the world’s fastest growing commercial 
sectors and an international endeavor (Atlas, 2002, p.753). 
“Since 1992, the number of government funded biotechnology companies has 
tripled,” allowing for both positive and negative end results (Carafano & Gudgel, 2007, 
p.634). Many of the advancements in biotechnology are dual-use, meaning that while 
certain advances may provide faster-acting, more effective drugs or allow for 
increasingly productive crops, the same advancements could also be used to create lethal 
biological weapons. “In the future, germs might be designed not only to kill, but to 
manipulate all the life processes – cognition, development, reproduction, etc.” (Miller et 
al, 2002, p.314).  
Technological innovations have already allowed for the creation of novel viruses 
that have “undergone critical genetic changes, making them: more easily transmittable 
from person to person, able to survive in the environment longer, and more virulent” 
(Osterholm, 2007, p.8). As a result, several U.S. states have recently experienced a surge 
of stronger measles outbreaks as well as stronger forms of both Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(Hamburg et al, 2008, p.4). With modern advances, besides making existing strains of 
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diseases more powerful, entirely new diseases can be created. DNA replication or Gene 
Synthesis is the process of replicating an artificially designed gene to create new strains 
of viruses, bacteria, etc. (Woodward, 2006, p.3). Using these advances, even an ethnic-
specific bio-weapon, targeting certain genetic markers, could be created in the future 
(Kellman, 2007, p.51).  
Conclusion 
Man-made threats to human health are perhaps more prolific now than ever. With 
advancements in technology, groups seeking to do harm can easily find pathways on the 
internet and use modern communications to their benefit. Arriving through “friendly 
travel and trade,” a biological attack can also be enacted unintentionally through the 
facilitation of invasive species. Due to the ease in which people now travel, it has become 
apparent that “the health of U.S. citizens is inextricably linked to the health and actions of 
people in other parts of the world,” and infectious diseases may soon become a serious 
intrusion on U.S. soil (Hamburg et al, 2008, p.1). 
Regarding the chance of U.S. agriculture being attacked, as vast numbers of 
organisms, including various molds, viruses, etc., are easily being grown in laboratories 
at no threat to humans, they can be transported without detection and unleashed without 
health hazard to the releaser. Due to the fact that agriculture itself often acts as the 
primary vector for pathogen spread, costly methods for disbursing a virus or bacteria also 
do not need to be purchased. There is no need for elaborate containment procedures, 
personal protective equipment, or antibiotics to prepare, reducing many technical 
difficulties which are frequently cited as the most significant barriers preventing terrorist 
use of biological agents. Unleashing a biological assault upon agriculture would thus 
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utilize cheap and unsophisticated means, yet would still be able to undermine a 
government’s economic base, providing any terrorist group with an attractive cost-benefit 
payoff (Chalk, 2004, p.28).  
Also occurring throughout the world, countries are beginning to enhance their 
biological facilities. While many of these facilities are dual-use, this has only made them 
easier to hide, raising deep concerns regarding how many facilities in the world are being 
used for negative weapons creation. In 2007, the United States intelligence community’s 
National Intelligence Estimate published that “the U.S. Homeland will face a persistent 
and evolving terrorist threat over the coming years from numerous state-sponsored 
groups and cells” (Gerber, 2007, p.1).  
Overall, to prepare for any potential biological threat to national security, 
vigilance and response measures must not be left in the hands of an already overly 
expanded federal government. In order to interrupt a terrorist group’s goal of disrupting 
society, policies must be strengthened within each U.S. city and state. Citizens must 
become just as prepared as trained specialists, for even the talk of biological attack can 
serve to create great fear and turmoil. Hopefully, this preparation in and of itself will 
serve to diminish a terrorist’s ability to undermine the government’s role as protector of 
the people and will strengthen local response capabilities and the ability of the country to 
recover quickly from a major epidemic as a whole.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
LAS VEGAS AS A CASE STUDY 
 
With rapidly evolving global interactions and ecologies, it has thus far been 
suggested that current societies are soon to be faced with significant health risks. As such, 
it is important to determine what strategies, policies and measures are available to reduce 
the impacts, as well as which infrastructures and agencies need to be strengthened or 
reformed. As the best knowledge and expertise regarding conditions of any region is 
generally found at the local level, local authorities are the preeminent source of 
information regarding preparedness mechanisms for coping and recovering from the 
impact of any biological emergency (Graeger, 1996, p.114).  
Vindicating federalist ideals, response procedures are always initiated at the local 
level, yet mitigation measures can only be successful with sufficient resources from the 
federal government. Conscious of this fact, local emergency mangers must be aware of 
the hierarchy involved in obtaining additional assistance, primarily the interaction that 
occurs between local, state, and federal emergency response agencies when local 
capabilities are insufficient. Cooperation and communication amongst different levels of 
government response is thus essential. As federalist ideals work best when local first 
responders are able to avoid the chaos of competing organizations, the following chapter 
seeks to better understand the progression from local to federal control during disasters. 
Las Vegas: A Unique City 
Within the United States, looking specifically at the state of Nevada, the region 
presents a unique situation demographically. While the city of Las Vegas, situated in the 
southern portion of Nevada, is a large and booming urban metropolis, the center and 
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northern regions of the state are rural, with isolated towns scattered throughout. Within 
the state it has been presumed that a biological threat to security is most likely to occur in 
the city of Las Vegas, where many tourists from all regions of the world come to visit and 
can bring with them a variety of pathogens.  
People visiting the city of Las Vegas often stay for only a short period of time, 
typically no longer than a weekend getaway. In terms of a health threat, visitors are thus 
able to spread an infectious disease, particularly one with a longer incubation period, 
asymptomatically. Evidence of this fact transpired as recently as the 2009 H1N1, Swine 
Flu pandemic. According to the Southern Nevada Health District, the first reported flu-
related death in Las Vegas occurred in a tourist. On June 12, 2009 an apparently healthy 
seventy year old woman visiting the city from New York died in a local Las Vegas 
hospital. While the elderly woman’s visit to the city and hospital may have infected many 
others, she perished quickly due to underlying conditions, and was thus un-influential.  
Tourism presents a unique situation because visitors can easily turn a localized 
epidemic into a pandemic quite quickly. During the SARS pandemic, just one infected 
person staying in a Hong Kong hotel resulted in the transmission of the disease to a dozen 
or so guests. A chain reaction then allowed those dozen guests to eventually infect up to 
8,000 more in two dozen countries. In total, “774 people eventually died from an 
epidemic that had rippled out from just a single case” (Kettl, 2009, p.121).  
While tourism can be considered a hazard to the city of Las Vegas due to 
infiltrating disease, it is also essential to its economic survival. According to the Center 
for Business and Economic Research (CBER) at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 
tourism in the city accounts for a large part of the state’s revenues. Nevada has no state 
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income tax and thus relies heavily on revenues generated from outside sources. 
Additionally, CBER estimates that approximately 230,000 Nevada jobs depend on 
tourism for their survival in some way. Again looking to the SARS pandemic as an 
example, in just six months the disease cost the Asian region almost 100 billion dollars in 
economic growth due at least in part to greatly reduced tourism. If this were to occur on a 
smaller scale within the city of Las Vegas, it is easy to conclude that the occurrence 
would be economically catastrophic.  
A City in Crisis 
Keeping a population safe and managing health effectively requires taking into 
account the social and cultural determinants of health, as well as local behaviors and 
practices (Menne & Ebi, 2006, p.406). Vulnerability to a biological catastrophe includes 
issues of economic and political disparities between groups and disparities in other assets 
like knowledge and information (Gerber, 2007, p.229). As such, it is important to first 
define current social problems within the city of Las Vegas.  
Currently, Nevada’s population consists of approximately 2.7 million people. The 
vast majority of that number resides in Clark County, which includes the city of Las 
Vegas. Regarding the health of its population, the state ranked forty-two in the 2008 
America’s Health Rank, with Nevada dropping to among the ten unhealthiest states in the 
country due to certain state trends such as low graduation and high crime rates (Pope, 
2009, p.1). In a repeat of 2008, in 2009 Nevada remained the lowest-ranking graduation 
state in the nation with a commencement rate of just 47.3 percent. According to 
Education Week’s annual Diplomas Count study, “Clark County’s graduation rate is even 
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lower at 46.8 percent, placing it at 43 among the nation’s 50 largest school 
districts”(Haug, 2009, p.1).  
Coinciding with low graduation rates are poor education levels in general, and 
education has often proven to be a vital contributor to health. According to the CDC, 
there is a clear direct link between education and a healthy life. The less schooling one 
achieves, the higher their levels of risky health behaviors such as smoking, being 
overweight, not being active, etc. (Pope, 2009, p.1). Regarding the spread of a disease 
epidemic, just several leading risk factors; smoking, alcoholism, high blood pressure, 
high cholesterol, and low physical activity are mainly responsible for differences in the 
burden of disease, and Nevada residents suffer from all of these ailments (Menne & Ebi, 
2006, p.395).  
Further affecting the health of Las Vegas residents is the fact that homelessness in 
the city is entering a new high. The city has recently been referred to as the epicenter of 
the nation’s housing crisis. Nevada’s Governor Jim Gibbons in fact stated that “one in 
every forty-three households in the city received a foreclosure filing during 2008,” and it 
has been predicted that one in eleven homes may be entering foreclosure by 2010 
(Urevich, 2008, p.1). This has forced many in the city to postpone obtaining appropriate 
preventative health care, thus allowing them to become the perfect vectors for any 
potentially devastating infectious disease (Elphinstone, 2008, p.1).  
Local Immigration and its Effect on Health  
Further escalating any localized epidemic, Nevada has recently been identified as 
a state with low health insurance coverage and immunization rates amongst its population 
(Pope, 2009). Much of this can be attributed to the state’s unique transient rate, as well as 
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foreign immigration rates. According to the Nevada census, about thirty percent of the 
state’s population is composed of immigrants, primarily from Mexico and the 
Philippines. Unfortunately, many of these immigrants are un-naturalized. Based upon 
data obtained during the 2000 census, Nevada’s naturalization rate of 36.9 percent is 
much lower than the national average of 40.1 percent. This is threatening to the health of 
local residents because un-naturalized immigrants are not screened medically like legal 
immigrants, and thus may arrive to the state with any number of preexisting conditions 
and diseases (Brower & Chalk, 2003, p.64).  
Local Ecological Changes and their Effect on Health  
Within the city of Las Vegas water is in limited supply. The Colorado River 
System that supplies water to Las Vegas not only has the arduous task of growing much 
of “America’s domestic production of fresh winter vegetables, but it has more people, 
more industry, and a more significant economy dependent on it than any comparable 
river in the world” (Tobin, 1990, p.189). The Colorado River system was the first 
drainage basin in which the concept of multiple uses was put into practice: it is used for 
power, irrigation, flood control, recreation, etc. providing water to over twenty five 
million people in seven states (Gilpin, 2000, p.168). Essential to biological survival, 
water is perhaps the only resource that cannot be substituted for anything else, and in the 
Southwestern portion of the United States, it is quickly depleting. Regarding the 
progression of disease, a simple shortage in water has proven to be responsible for a 
major portion of acute and chronic infections the world over (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p.91).  
One major reason the water supply is dwindling throughout Las Vegas is due to 
excessive heat and drought. According to the Washington Post, in 2007 Nevada ranked as 
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a state with the most dramatic increase in average temperatures over the last thirty years. 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Professor of Geology, Stephen M. Rowland states that, 
since the turn of the century, “Las Vegas’ average summer temperature has been 3.6 
degrees above its 30-year average.” Again applying these statistics to the health of local 
residents, in people who are already obese or suffering from underlying chronic 
conditions, death can occur much more easily with such drastic increases in heat. 
Local Population Distribution and its Effect on Health  
With much of Nevada being rural, isolated towns are scattered throughout the 
middle and northern portions of the state. If any sort of epidemic were to initiate in one of 
these more remote locations, it would be much more difficult to provide treatment in a 
timely manner. Isolated areas are less easily accessed, leaving them susceptible to an 
infectious disease that could easily spread to urban locales. Small counties suddenly 
infiltrated by a fast-spreading disease may rapidly begin to “lose important government 
figures and social servants who can help promote prevention, as well as medical 
professionals and employees” (Lamptey et al, 2006, p.19). Without key figures working 
to respond to an outbreak in an isolated area, any larger city nearby would not be able to 
preempt its own infestation.  
Adding to the problem is the fact that most rural health care facilities do not 
possess many types of technology needed to quickly inform both the CDC and 
neighboring counties or cities. Recently, Nevada surveyed its local health agencies to 
assess readiness in terms of a pandemic. It was reported in the Las Vegas Review Journal 
that: 50 percent lacked high-speed internet access, 94 percent lacked adequate emergency 
preparedness training (with 77 percent lacking an emergency response plan directly 
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addressing a bioterrorist attack), and 46 percent did not have broadcast facsimile 
capabilities for emergency notifications (Chereb, 2008, p.1). In 2008, the Trust for 
America’s Health Foundation gave Nevada six out of ten possible points for emergency 
preparedness, the same score it has received since 2005. It cited additional weaknesses 
including: “failure to have an intrastate courier system for 24-hour lab analysis, not 
having an Internet-based disease surveillance system compatible with the National 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and not having a state medical reserve corps 
coordinator” (Chereb, 2008 p.1).  
Oftentimes, physicians also choose to stay away from practicing in remote 
locations. This is true primarily in the realm of emergency care, as emergency procedures 
are deemed too risky to undergo in remote locations where backup is not immediately 
available (Babula, 2002, p.1). According to a recent study, the shortage of physicians in 
rural areas is a longstanding and serious problem that state policymakers continue to face 
(Rabinowitz et al, 1999, p.256). Furthermore, since most physicians seek to practice in 
areas where they can comfortably turn the most profit, rural areas are often left by the 
wayside in exchange for practicing in larger, urban metropolises.  
Local Physician Shortage 
It is obvious that if a region already suffers from inadequate health care services, 
then any additional threats to human health will only exacerbate the problem. In order to 
best determine how prepared a city will be in the face of a biological crisis then, it is first 
important to observe any weaknesses in the region’s current health care infrastructures. 
One major area of weakness within Las Vegas’ health care system lies with a shortage of 
medical physicians. 
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According to the University of Nevada, School of Medicine, Nevada ranks among 
the lowest in the nation regarding its physician to population ratio. Much of this can be 
attributed to rising malpractice premiums throughout the state which are discouraging 
many physicians from staying in practice and forcing others to relocate (Debas, 2003, 
p.979). Issues of malpractice have become prominent throughout the country. Lawsuits 
are said to be on the rise because while in the past a patient in need of a hazardous 
surgery would never contemplate suing as he or she was almost certainly going to die, in 
the last sixty years or so the public’s expectations of both physicians and the 
technological advancemans they rely upon have risen drastically (Hoffman, 2005, p.1).  
In Nevada, “a computer-assisted analysis of national malpractice data shows that 
higher average malpractice settlements are paid for physicians here than in neighboring 
states” (Sloan, 2004, p.1). In fact, Nevada’s average settlement for medical doctors is 
thirty-three percent higher than other Western states. Using the public-use version of the 
National Practitioners Data Bank, it has been verified that “the average payment per 
malpractice settlement in Nevada over the past fourteen years was $209,652…more than 
twice California’s average” (Sloan, 2004, p.1).  
Further forcing many physicians to leave the city of Las Vegas is the fact that “in 
2002 a 5.4% payment cut was passed that totaled about $12.2 million, or about $4,263 
per physician” (Rizzo, 1989, p.483). This cut has primarily affected Medicare 
reimbursements, resulting in an American Medical Association survey finding that “one 
in four physicians either has restricted or plans to restrict the number or type of Medicare 
patients treated” (Rizzo, 1989, p.490). With lower Medicare reimbursements to 
physicians, vulnerable, elderly patients in Las Vegas have had an increasingly difficult 
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time gaining access to the medical community. If an epidemic were to transpire, a large 
portion of the population would thus be immediately at risk, leaving the door open for a 
pathogen to spread easily to other sectors of the public.  
Overall, physician numbers are dwindling. Besides through payment cuts, cuts to 
Medicare funds additionally affect the supply of physicians through reductions in medical 
residencies, which all medical students must undergo. By reducing such funding, 
Congress has saved money, but has also caused a decrease in physicians for the future.  
As of now, there are less students training to be primary care physicians than 
retiring from the profession, and “physicians older than fifty-five years of age work about 
15% less than younger doctors” (Cauchon, 2005, p.1). Frighteningly, there is currently 
about “one physician per 350 patients,” but it is suggested that “in the year 2020, when 
Americans are older and there are new medical procedures keeping patients alive longer, 
the population will require approximately one physician for every 275 persons” (Weiner, 
2004, p.2). With reductions in physician numbers occurring for multiple reasons, there 
will clearly be consequences for local health care facilities attempting to respond to 
future threats to biological security.  
Negligent Physicians  
In reaction to soaring malpractice costs and payment cuts, many Southern Nevada 
physicians are claiming that in order to stay in practice they must now double their 
patient loads (Debas, 2003, p.981). Ironically, by doubling patient loads, physicians are 
also doubling their chances of making a mistake, leaving the door open to either 
misdiagnoses or a complete oversight of a problem. A recent example of such negligent 
malpractice within Southern Nevada occurred in a Las Vegas endoscopy clinic. In 2008, 
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this endoscopy clinic was found to have re-used syringes, eventually causing forty 
thousand people to become potentially exposed to HIV and Hepatitis C infections.  
In an attempt to further cut costs and ensure avoiding potential lawsuits, many 
physicians are increasingly relying on the use of defensive medicine. Defensive medicine 
can be described as a physician reducing his or her exposure to lawsuits by “performing 
redundant and unnecessary diagnostic tests” (Barr, 2003, p.1). Besides raising medical 
costs, defensive medicine dangerously prevents physicians from offering certain types of 
more beneficial, but perhaps risky advice. This not only leads to an overall decrease in 
medical services, but if a biological invasion of some sort were to occur, physicians 
afraid to treat atypical ailments may dangerously transfer an infectious patient from 
physician to physician. Furthermore, by simply going through the motions, many doctors 
would miss many tell tale signs of a coming epidemic.  
To discover exactly “how often physicians alter their clinical behavior because of 
the threat of malpractice liability,” in 2005 a survey was mailed out by researchers to 
physicians within six high-risk specialties (Studdert et al, 2005, p.2610). These 
specialties: emergency medicine, general surgery, orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, 
obstetrics/gynecology, and radiology, generally experience high levels of malpractice 
suits. “A total of 824 physicians (65%) completed the survey and nearly all (93%) 
reported practicing defensive medicine” (Studdert et al, 2005, p.2615). These physicians 
admitted to avoiding patients they deemed highly litigious and admitted to limiting 
procedures prone to complications, resulting in poorer medical care.  
Treating victims during a mass infiltration of an infectious disease would require 
many hospital beds, isolation rooms, and if the disease calls for long term care, definitely 
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sufficient numbers of qualified staff. While much of this relies on transforming 
malpractice policies and sustaining physician pay rates in Nevada, policies must also 
incorporate proper training in the realm of large-sale pathogen invasion. If an emergency 
is large enough, multiple local agencies may further become involved in the response 
effort, potentially creating a bureaucratic nightmare if local medical staff are unprepared.  
Case Study 
 
Both ecological change and the results of an intentional biological attack will 
present local citizens with unique challenges as new health risks are introduced into 
previously unaffected areas. In order to best determine how prepared the city of Las 
Vegas in particular is to respond to a localized disease epidemic, there are two areas of 
focus that must be assessed. First responder agencies must be interviewed in order to 
determine how they are prepared to respond to a biological emergency, and local policies 
must be reviewed in order to observe the steps laid out for first responders to follow.  
Utilizing methodological triangulation, involving the convergence of data from 
multiple data collection sources, the hope is to compare informal interviews with formal 
response plans to observe the actual amount of coordination and cooperation occurring 
between those who create emergency plans, and those who actually act on them. Using 
post-positivist and interpretive research paradigms, the methodology utilized in this 
research will thus be both direct interviews and document analysis. 
Why Interview First Responders?  
In order to receive first-hand accounts of any localized emergency, emergency 
mangers and governments have to rely on the reports of local first responders who deal 
directly with victims. Local first responders and disaster mitigation departments serve as 
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the catalyst for having a smooth recovery process. With regard to localized emergencies, 
“the first hours of disaster response often determine the success or failure of overall 
mitigation efforts” (Waugh, 2000, p.43). 
First responders are defined as: local law enforcement, members of the fire 
department, and those with sufficient medical expertise to properly treat victims. “Fire 
and police departments, as well as emergency medical teams, are assumed to know the 
likely natural hazards specific to their area, prepare and train for them, and can be on the 
scene within minutes” (Schneck, 2009, p.6). Unique to germ terrorism, the first 
responders at the scene of any disease attack would also include experts from the local 
health department, attempting to ascertain the origin and extent of an epidemic. Overall, 
it is important to first discover how first responders understand and have prepared for 
biological threats to human security, in order to then ascertain exactly how proficient the 
city is to responding to such hazards.  
Document Analysis  
Documents can often be useful when attempting to understand the philosophy of 
an agency. In the state of Nevada, the Nevada Division of Emergency Management: 
Disaster Response and Recovery Guide for Local Government became the first attempt to 
consolidate, in a single reference, the steps and criteria required to declare a local 
emergency. By completing the process for each progressive step, emergency managers 
are hopefully able to seek additional assistance in an orderly manner.  
According to the guide, once an emergency occurs, the initial response procedure 
is to notify public officials and first responders to deploy as indicated in the local 
emergency operations plan. The next step is to lessen the spread of harm by alerting 
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citizens of potential hazards and any known safety measures through public information 
systems. In reference to an epidemic, disease spread can be reduced in several ways: 
through improved medical access and preventative information; through the reduction of 
population exposure by quarantine; or through the reduction of population sensitivity 
through vaccines distributed en masse (Menne & Ebi, 2006, p.48). 
Whether procedures like evacuation measures are necessary is then analyzed 
through a rapid assessment of the situation, conducted by the local government. 
Assessments include analyzing, identifying, and confirming that an emergency has in fact 
occurred, identifying the nature, severity and potential impact of the emergency, and then 
drafting a local declaration of disaster in order to formally declare the extent of damage 
and harm to local inhabitants. If the assessment concludes that the emergency has 
escalated to a situation beyond local resource capabilities, that situation can be declared a 
major or catastrophic disaster. The Nevada Division of Emergency Management defines 
a catastrophic disaster as an event that: results in large numbers of deaths, causes 
extensive damage to facilities that provide and sustain human needs, produces an 
overwhelming demand on state and local response resources, causes a severe long-term 
effect on general economic activity, and severely affects capabilities to sustain response 
activities.  
As of now, the steps for requesting further assistance are as follows. When local 
resources are insufficient, the state intervenes. Resources in this case are defined as any 
and all equipment, materials, personnel and finances that would be employed to respond 
to an emergency, including things like vaccines and medications. If the state is incapable, 
then federal support can be requested. A State Disaster Declaration, made by the state 
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Governor, is submitted through the State Division of Emergency Management for review. 
Within this declaration must be a dollar estimate of damage along with cost estimates 
obtained through the damage assessment survey. All of this formulates quite a lengthy 
process.  
It is clear from the guide that local governments are on their own for all small to 
moderate-scale biological invasions. As the Emergency Plan only allows for federal 
assistance to be called upon after local and state resources have become completely 
depleted, “the actual mobilization of federal resources in response to an outbreak is 
necessarily contingent on local and state capabilities to detect their own limitations” 
(Brower & Chalk, 2003, p.76). When local capabilities are determined to be completely 
overwhelmed, then state governments can call on the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), an under funded government agency for assistance. While the chance 
of disease having a great impact on society depends upon many things such as access to 
health care, demographics, social behaviors, etc., it seems apparent that “a network based 
emergency management plan of preparedness, response, and recovery has the greatest 
potential to reduce health impacts following a biological disaster” (Menne & Ebi, 2006, 
p.117).  
First Responder Interviews  
Since attempting to determine exact numerical values is not possible when 
speaking of preparedness levels for an event that has not yet occurred, quantitative 
research must be substituted for research that focuses more on the opinions and 
experiences of individuals; qualitative research is thus to be used. Using inductive rather 
than deductive reasoning, the objective is to obtain greater knowledge of how local first 
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responders have been affected by recent climatic and terrorism events. This research 
hopes to better understand the opinions, attitudes, developments, behaviors, etc., of those 
in charge of emergency response.  
To sufficiently answer questions of how heads of emergency response understand 
and are prepared to deal with a local biological crisis, individual interviews were 
conducted involving a series of open-ended questions. Using a semi-structured interview 
format, there were many opportunities for interviewees to discuss certain topics in greater 
detail and elaborate on responses where necessary. Through direct encounters with heads 
of first responder teams, as well as those in the local health department, data obtained 
was then used to develop theories regarding local preparedness measures and plans. The 
exact interview questionnaires are located in Appendix A.  
Results 
 While certain events may occur that individuals cannot control in the realm of 
disease infestation, regions can still prepare for the recovery process. In order to discover 
whether influential members of Las Vegas emergency management systems are taking 
the threat of pathogen invasion seriously and properly preparing for disease events, 
interviews were thus conducted. Nicole Hart, Emergency Preparedness Manager for the 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was interviewed, along with: 
Major David M. Sellen, Commander of the 92nd Civil Support Team in charge of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Alan Osborne, Clark County’s Senior Deputy Fire Chief, 
Richard Brenner, Head of Clark County Fire Department’s Hazardous Response Team, 
and both Jennifer Sizemore and Jane Shunney, of the Southern Nevada Health District. 
Results of the questionnaires are listed in Appendix B.  
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After conducting interviews across different fields and agencies, one thing 
became clear; emergency preparedness in the realm of pandemics has not been ranked 
especially high within Southern Nevada until the last few years. According to both Nicole 
Hart and Major Sellen, only since the recent publicity of H1N1 flu has pandemic 
planning become a top priority within their agencies. Senior Deputy Fire Chief Alan 
Osborne similarly summarized that “until events such as the H1N1 virus raise public 
awareness,” local resources are often not allocated to prepare for them (personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
Locally, the Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) is lead on the issue of 
planning for any disease event. As publicity regarding the H1N1 virus spread, however, 
SNHD was not able to immediately gain access to a sufficient amount of resources 
needed to track and mitigate the disease, particularly sufficient amounts of H1N1 
vaccine. Vaccine insufficiencies have taken place despite the fact that it has been 
concluded by the health community that the best protection against disease spread is 
prevention, as well as the fact that H1N1 influenza vaccine has recently taken both public 
and fiscal priority.  
Due to vaccine shortages the CDC has recommended certain priority groups 
deemed most at-risk for severe illness or complications from H1N1 influenza to receive 
the vaccine first. Vaccine priority groups include: pregnant women, caregivers for 
children younger than 6 months of age because infants cannot be vaccinated, those 
between the ages of six months and twenty-four years because they are in close contact 
with each other increasing the likelihood of disease spread, those under the age of sixty-
four who have health conditions associated with higher risk of medical complications 
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from influenza, and healthcare and emergency medical services personnel who have 
direct contact with those infected.  
According to the SNHD website, as of mid-October 2009 the local health district 
received approximately 48,000 doses of H1N1 influenza vaccine, with the initial delivery 
consisting primarily of an inhaled vaccine mist. This inhaled form is a live, attenuated 
influenza vaccine, meaning that it is only approved for healthy people between the ages 
of two and forty-nine, and not for pregnant women or children and adults who have 
underlying medical conditions. In terms of priority groups, only three groups can 
therefore receive the mist; those with infants, school-age children, and medical personnel. 
As such, it is apparent that many Las Vegas residents have been left unvaccinated.  
Preparing for Disease Epidemics 
 
In order to gauge levels of preparedness in the realm of emergency management 
regarding threats to human health, managers were asked to rate their preparations for both 
intentional and natural threats. Representing one side of the spectrum, Major Sellen 
responded by stating that “preparations for diseases due to intentional causes [were] 
prioritized” within his civil support team over those that stemmed from natural sources 
(electronic communication, July 1, 2009). On the other side of the spectrum, the Clark 
County Fire Department ranked itself as most prepared to deal with diseases stemming 
from natural sources, as the department is trained to deal with such emergencies on a 
daily basis.  
While the Clark County Fire Department (CCFD) responded to the questionnaire 
comprehensively, admitting that its existing emergency plans do not “identify specific 
areas and populations within the valley that are more susceptible to certain types of 
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biological threats,” both Nicole hart of the LVMPD and Major Sellen responded broadly 
(Alan Osborne and Richard Brenner, personal communication, October 16, 2009). Both 
concluded that they would be a support agency for hazardous situations stemming from 
either intentional or natural sources, utilizing an “all hazards approach” to emergency 
management (Nicole Hart, personal communication, October 7, 2009). This means that 
all victims, despite the source of their injuries, are rushed to medical care in the same 
manner. “Response is focused on patient stabilization so that they may be transported to 
hospitals where they can receive definitive advanced care, quickly” (personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
Even though each agency did respond positively to being able to mobilize during 
either a terrorist incident or natural catastrophe, no agency had a specific plan in place to 
deal with a widespread disease epidemic. In fact, regarding the spread of a highly 
infectious disease, implementing a “shelter-in-place” is the only option that the CCFD 
has even discussed (Alan Osborne and Richard Brenner, personal communication, 
October 16, 2009). Much of this is due to a heavy reliance on the SNHD to dictate 
response procedures during such an occurrence. Assisted by the Southern Nevada Public 
Health Laboratory (SNPHL) which collects recent mortality rates, doctor reports, recent 
hospital admissions, and emergency room consultations from health care facilities, the 
SNHD has the responsibility of properly surveying the local community and gauging 
disease spread. Actual response plans and procedures for disease infestations, however, 
are addressed at the city and county level.  
With most response agencies lacking any preparedness plan specific to dealing 
with a large-scale biological epidemic, the SNHD must ensure that it is capable of 
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properly communicating advice and information to emergency managers in an efficient 
manner. To meet any public health challenges, the health district must also keep its local 
health care providers informed of recent disease occurrences. As of now, the main SNHD 
website does provide an outlet for the health care community to both report diseases in a 
timely manner and receive bulletins and informational links regarding emerging 
infectious diseases.  
It seems as though all information regarding the Southern Nevada Health 
District’s preparedness plans is currently located on their website. Both Jane Shunney 
and Jennifer Sizemore, who happens to be the public information officer for SNHD, 
refused to answer the majority of the interview questions. Instead, Jane Shunney stated 
that all the information that the department can share with the public at any given time is 
available online. For this reason, interview responses by the SNHD are the only ones not 
found in the Appendix. On the website, one can find statistics and rates of disease 
occurrence within southern Nevada by month, as well as the tracking information for 
antimicrobial cases.  
Organization and Coordination 
The Clark County Office of Emergency Management is responsible for disaster 
preparedness plans as well as coordinating mobilization and response during 
emergencies. Document analysis of the emergency response plan was conducted in a 
previous section. In agreement with the emergency response plan, interviewees stated 
that for any agency, the first step is to immediately utilize local and state resources. Once 
these resources are exhausted, only then may federal resources be requested.  
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With regard to local agency resources, the CCFD budget is “minimal,” with most 
funding for equipment stemming from the County General Fund. Additionally, there is 
some grant money that is specifically designated to hazardous materials training and 
response, but typically it is carefully parceled out and shared amongst each of the 
response agencies within Clark County (Alan Osborne and Richard Brenner, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). As for the LVMPD, during any large-scale 
catastrophe, its own minimal fund is supplemented with modestly parceled federal grants.  
Throughout the interviews, each emergency manager did specify that he or she 
had consistent contact with local, state, regional, and national emergency responders and 
governments, but emphasized that there are many complicated stages to disaster relief. 
Comparing the described progression of obtaining federal relief by the interviewees, with 
the progression described earlier in the emergency response plan, both are very similar 
revealing an accepted mode of requesting federal assistance. According to emergency 
mangers in CCFD, any local jurisdiction within Clark County would first contact the 
Clark County Office of Emergency Management. After contacting the County, if the 
disaster is still beyond local capabilities, the request goes on to the Nevada State Office 
of Emergency Management. If beyond the State’s capability, only then is the request 
forwarded to the national level (Alan Osborne and Richard Brenner, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
Once creating a declaration for federal assistance, the hope is that federal 
emergency response agencies will provide local agencies with additional resources in a 
quick and synchronized manner. Unfortunately, judging by the interview responses, it 
seems as though much of this assistance often arrives in an uncoordinated manner and in 
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a delayed fashion. As such, the dynamic between local and federal agencies must be 
assessed further, and will be assessed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
All in all, it seems as though federal assistance is most valued by local agencies 
when it appears in the form of additional resources and funding. Problematically, quite a 
bit of time is lost when attempting to obtain any federal government assistance at all. By 
the time additional resources do arrive, it is often too late to do much good. If federalist 
ideals are to effectively work within the realm of emergency response then, local regions 
need to be properly prepared. In this sense, a major theme arose out of the conversations 
conducted with emergency responders. It revolved around being able to preemptively 
obtain additional resources before any major disaster takes place.  
Conclusion 
For the past ten years or so “Las Vegas has been facing one of the worst medical 
emergencies in the nation” leaving the city particularly vulnerable to increases in 
incidences of both naturally occurring and intentional outbreaks of infectious diseases 
(Babula, 2002, p.2). Overall from the interviews conducted, it appears that in terms of 
possessing a comprehensive training plan for biological emergencies the CCFD is the 
most organized of all the other agencies. The CCFD plan is concise, naming the 
hazardous materials team as being in charge of response.  
In fact, first responders in other departments depend on the hazardous materials 
team for mitigation of incidents that require specialized training and/or personal 
protective equipment. Hazardous materials teams and technicians beneath the sphere of 
the fire department “receive the most comprehensive training of all members of first 
response” (Alan Osborne and Richard Brenner, personal communication, October 16, 
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2009). While first responders in other departments are trained only to the operations 
level, these teams must attain re-certifications in a number of different fields at on-going 
intervals.  
Problematically, both local police and fire departments do not have in place any 
formal next-in-line programs ensuring a pipeline of successors for critical posts. This 
means that if command staffs become incapacitated during an epidemic, there are no 
immediate experts to fill their positions. Additionally, Nicole Hart concluded the Las 
Vegas has its own unique problems in terms of being able to mitigate the effects of a fast-
spreading infectious disease.  
In order to coordinate transportation issues, multiple agencies including: the 
“Nevada Highway Patrol, LVMPD, the Nevada Department of Transportation, Public 
Works, etc. would all have to be involved” (Nicole Hart, personal communication, 
October 7, 2009). Furthermore in terms of tourism, responsibilities would be dispersed 
across “the Las Vegas Security Chiefs Association, as well as each individual hotel” 
(Nicole Hart, personal communication, October 7, 2009). Within the city of Las Vegas, 
because tourism is a primary industry, the hotels have a great deal of power. As such, 
each would have the freedom to determine for itself whether to temporarily refuse guests 
or remain open during an epidemic. 
With numerous and diverse actors involved, Major Sellen easily states that any 
large-scale epidemic occurring within the city of Las Vegas “would not be a pleasant 
situation” (electronic communication, July 1, 2009). Simply keeping track of the millions 
of visitors that temporarily reside in Las Vegas at any given time is an enormous task, 
making it difficult to monitor and thwart disease spread. While loss of life would be 
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tragic during a large-scale epidemic, damage to the local economy as the result of such an 
event would be devastating and extremely difficult to recover from.  
To conclude, emergency mangers are not required to participate in research and 
have little motivation to do so on an issue which involves a great deal of secrecy. As 
such, many of the interview questions were either not answered at all, or were answered 
in an over simplified manner. In order to obtain a more comprehensive view of how 
prepared local agencies are in the face of a large-scale emergency then, additional 
research must be conducted. The next chapter will utilize a historical comparative 
approach to analyze response measures initiated by local regions during emergencies of 
the past. By applying this research method, the goal is to perceive the true effectiveness 
and benefit of carrying out a polycentric government plan regarding hazard mitigation, in 
comparison with a federal-centered approach.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PAST 
 
As a primary goal, the government of any country should seek to protect its 
citizens from harm. While the word harm can be defined in many ways, on the largest 
scale it is often described in terms of a disaster, or “the interdependent cascade of failures 
triggered by an extreme event” (Comfort, 2002, p.338). Once a disaster does occur, it 
then becomes the government’s responsibility to ensure that the emergency is not 
exacerbated by inadequate coordination and ill-informed organizational response. 
Perhaps the best way to ensure that organizational and structural mistakes of the past in 
the realm of emergency preparedness are not repeated in the future is to look at previous 
domestic disasters.  
Clearly, the two most recent catastrophic disasters to hit the United States were 
the events of September 11th and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Following the 
attacks of September 11th, the federal government immediately began focusing on 
preventing the same type of emergency from occurring again. Plans and policies to 
prevent terrorists from hijacking planes were enacted, while a multitude of other threats 
cropping up to challenge the U.S. emergency management infrastructure were ignored. 
Due to this fact, a catastrophe on the scale of September 11th did transpire again, this time 
in the form of Hurricane Katrina.  
Just four years after the events of September 11th, in August 2005, Hurricane 
Katrina revealed that policymakers remained unprepared to deal with an array of 
disastrous threats geared towards the United States in the 21st century. Failing to 
anticipate the unexpected, the Southeastern region of the country was ill-equipped to 
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properly ameliorate a disaster that originated outside the realm of previous historical 
experience; a New Orleans levee breach. Hurricane Katrina was of course not a man-
made emergency, and thus represented a shift in the types of crises governments needed 
to prepare for. 
While each of these events stemmed from different sources, both required a 
significant amount of local-level resources and coordination to combat resulting damage. 
Analyzing the response conducted by local and federal agencies in regard to these events, 
one can easily see that emergency mangers in both situations were more reliant on 
effective, polycentric response than federal government presence. For this reason, the 
following chapter applies lessons learned from polycentric mitigation measures of the 
past, to the way in which emergency management agencies should be organized, 
strengthened and operated to respond to crises of the future. 
All Disasters are Local 
While the federal government is often in charge of mitigating the effects of any 
large disaster, most emergency and disaster management begins as a local government 
function. Within the United States, “ a degree of sovereignty is assumed at state and local 
levels of government resulting in local governments having most of the discretion and 
responsibility for emergency management functions like preparedness, response, and 
recovery” (Schneck, 2009, p.5). This came about because many natural emergencies tend 
to reoccur within specific areas and local authorities, familiar with their precise types of 
problems, are better able to mitigate or put in place certain practices that minimize the 
adverse effects of such disasters (Gerber, 2007, p.235). When an emergency is not 
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routine, however, chaos can ensue as “the locus of control and coordination shifts from 
local and state, to federal control” (Schneck, 2009, p.10). 
While the federalist system promotes localized initial response, with any large-
scale catastrophe federal intervention is imminent. Federal assistance often comes into 
play as the scale of a hazard event quickly increases (Gerber, 2007, p.228). Possessing 
many more funds and resources than state and local governments, federal response 
departments are thus relied upon to assist shattered and drained local agencies.  
Unless a region is completely incapacitated, the federal government cannot 
assume the reins for command during an emergency. Required to wait until 
circumstances are so devastating then, that state and local governments become victims 
themselves, federal response can often be hindered as localities become unable to 
properly request assistance (Schneck, 2009, p.15). Once federal authorities do arrive on 
the scene, efficient information sharing and response efforts are then complicated by the 
multitude of entities involved. “Policies that guide emergency response can vary widely 
in practice across federal, state, and local governmental entities,” so that measures 
initiated by local agencies may not even be useful to federal agencies arriving to pick up 
the pieces (Schneck, 2009, p.1). This can result in “duplication, lack of unity of effort, 
and diminished accountability” when trying to respond (Johnstone, 2008, p.55).  
The Hurricane Katrina Debacle  
“What government does regularly, it tends to do well” and natural catastrophes 
such as Hurricanes further provide governments with days to prepare (Kettl, 2009, p.33). 
Unfortunately during Hurricane Katrina, the routine effects of the storm were quickly 
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exacerbated by sudden levee breaches. This non-routine occurrence led to catastrophe, 
despite the “best efforts of government employees at all levels” (Kettl, 2009, p.16).  
It is the Stafford Act of 1988 that requires the governor to ask for help during a 
catastrophe in order to initiate federal government assistance (Kettl, 2009, p.24). Such a 
hierarchical model for requesting support proved detrimental during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina however. Adhering to the lengthy official process, “state and local 
officials in Louisiana had trouble defining just what they needed, leaving federal officials 
waiting for the right requests, submitted in just the right way for days” (Kettl, 2009, 
p.23). Similarly, while a request to the Pentagon for swift water rescue teams was made 
by the state, it too did not come to fruition due to an inability to approve the request in a 
timely manner (Cooper & Block, 2006, p.155). Just after the hurricane hit, the Coast 
Guard therefore became the most beneficial response mechanism, simply because it did 
not wait for official approval from either the federal government or the state to initiate 
life saving activities (Schneck, 2009, p.16).  
Further escalating the situation, local officials made grave mistakes in their 
supposed preparation for the hurricane. Regarding evacuation procedures, “state and local 
officials considered drafting Amtrak to help, but had never sealed the deal,” and in terms 
of the evacuees sheltered in the Superdome, no supplies were ever purchased to be placed 
in an extra storage unit that was specifically cleared for the occasion (Cooper & Block, 
2006, p.237). Federal assistance also arrived too late because the governor did not believe 
that the levees, which were built to hold the rising waters back, were breached for quite 
some time. Governor Blanco of Louisiana later stated that she would not have been so 
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dismissive regarding evaluating the levees had she been aware that the federal response 
was hanging on her ability to clarify the breach (Cooper & Block, 2006, p.150). 
Despite the fact that the federal government had supplied multiple up-to-date 
hurricane preparation plans to the region, Katrina revealed that the state of Louisiana’s 
response measures were truly lacking. There was “insufficient communication and 
coordination amongst first responders, a lack of any central gathering point for 
information, a lack of understanding by key state officials of their emergency 
responsibilities, and inadequate interagency planning” (Kettl, 2009, p.104). In part, this 
may have been due to the fact that each federally supplied plan was “hundreds of pages 
long, thick with appendixes and crammed with dense, jargon-filled prose” (Cooper & 
Block, 2006, p.5). Most alarming, each emergency plan was created without any local 
input whatsoever.  
To this day, the National Response Plan, which was created to have a more 
“consistent program of responding to large-scale disasters and catastrophes across states 
and localities,” does not allow state input or comments (Schneck, 2009, p.6). The national 
pan also has an obvious slant towards terrorism, so that when Katrina did happen, the 
section on natural disaster response was still incomplete. Once the Hurricane hit, and the 
levees were breached, virtually every federal, state, and local agency was thus left 
unprepared, each conducting an independent operation in response to the disaster (Cooper 
& Block, 2006, p.181). 
Besides confusing local response plans, when the federal government did 
eventually step in to help the state of Louisiana it was unable to provide much assistance. 
“Within seventy-two hours of Hurricane Katrina making landfall, the emergency 
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response network had increased from 58 to 410 actors” (Schneck, 2009, p.19). As the size 
of the response network increased, the response became more complex, and thus much 
more difficult to coordinate. All in all, local emergency response teams from Texas 
provided the most help, revealing an interesting “movement from federal to local control 
as the emergency escalated, rather than the accepted progression from local to federal 
control” (Schneck, 2009, p.19).  
Looking at the aftereffects of Hurricane Katrina, it appears obvious that relying 
on federal government intervention is not always the ideal solution. Stifled by 
bureaucracy and formal request procedures, the state of Louisiana was unable to act 
quickly, and therefore was forced to stand by as the disaster escalated. It seems as though 
the local government was hindered by insufficient federal guidance, and federal 
mitigation efforts were correspondingly hindered by a flawed initial response. Louisiana, 
like perhaps many other states, may have thus functioned better had it been provided with 
additional federal resources prior to the disaster, and less physical federal intervention 
post-disaster.  
Federal Intervention at its Worst 
 
Regarding preserving federalist ideals, the fact that local officials responded 
remarkably well to the shock of September 11th vindicates values of local and state 
independence. Local dominance appeared to be essential following the attacks, as first 
responders in the state of New York remained aware that quick response was vital. 
Unfortunately, the federal government was unable to follow the same mantra.  
Ideally during a localized crisis, vertical communication occurs between federal 
and state governments, while horizontal coordination takes place across local agencies 
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(Gerber, 2007, p.228). Table 5 in Appendix C reveals that local agencies possessed 
higher levels of coordination than federal agencies in nearly every realm during the 
response to 9/11. Prioritizing regional decision-makers thus provided a more dynamic 
framework for action than any federal-centered approach (Cooper & Block, 2006, p.301). 
Bureaucracy is often the main culprit working to slow federal intervention. When 
requesting federal assistance during an emergency, so much paperwork needs to be 
processed that “in recent years some state agencies have run training exercises focused 
solely on how to complete forms for the disaster declaration request” (Waugh, 2000, 
p.34). 
Federal intervention can hinder response in other ways as well. As evidenced by 
the Katrina debacle, federal officials can have trouble connecting with local agencies and 
assisting them in an efficient manner. With an increased number of agencies involved in 
response, all attempting to communicate regularly and exchange information frequently, 
it is difficult to make sure the right dots are connected properly (Schneck, 2009, p.4).  
Table 6 in Appendix C reveals just how many organizations were involved in 
response to 9/11, exemplifying the fact that federal assistance often arrives in the form of 
a multitude of different actors. These different actors can perceive the same pieces of 
information differently, leading to interactions that are limited, and occur primarily 
between organizations of similar type (Kettl, 2009, p.77). Since federal emergency 
management agencies are not located near the center of the crisis, they are often the 
agencies easily left out of communications.  
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The Department of Homeland Security 
Any incident that has the potential for significant impact on the nation’s well 
being is responded to beneath the sphere of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Currently, however, DHS has many obstacles hindering its functions. In 2003 DHS was 
created, integrating twenty-two separate agencies and more than 200,000 employees, to 
form the third largest agency in government (Gerber, 2007, p.3). With so many agencies 
and staff members beneath its sphere, DHS has thus far had trouble coordinating and 
mobilizing resources across the federal government in response to security threats 
(Gerber, 2007, p. 2).  
While the department’s main responsibility is to provide overwhelmed cities and 
states with a more organized response effort, the department’s largest concern over recent 
years has ironically become organizing its own organizations. At present, “the 
coordinator of homeland security has little real authority over the myriad of departments, 
agencies and offices that are involved in dealing with threats to biological security” 
(Waugh & Sylves, 2002, p.147). Due to troubles with bringing its many departments 
together into one collaborative unit, oftentimes information has flowed into DHS, but not 
out to those who need it (Cooper & Block, 2006, p.157). Regarding this branch of the 
federal government then, “the biggest areas needing improvement deal with the very 
‘connecting the dots’ problem that the department was created to solve” (Kettl, 2004, 
p.7).  
Additionally, the DHS reports to multiple congressional oversight committees 
which have stretched its resources and made it difficult to focus policy enactment and 
legislation (Gerber, 2007, p.2). Lacking sufficient resources of its own, the department is 
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unable to carry out its primary function of delivering resources to the sates. Overall, it 
appears as though the Department of Homeland Security was created more as a symbolic 
gesture of the federal government’s commitment to the security issue, rather than an 
actual efficient grouping of agencies meant to effectively assist states during a crisis. As 
such, the Department of Homeland Security has been reasonably unsuccessful, only 
serving to further emphasize the usefulness of applying federalist principles to localized 
emergency situations.  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 While the Department of Homeland Security was created as an umbrella agency, 
collecting information from multiple sources and reporting directly to the president, this 
task used to belong to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA was 
created in 1979 as an agency designed to mitigate local disasters. In the past, it was 
FEMA that could report directly to the President, making its role much more effective 
(Cooper & Block, 2006, p.77). Being able to relay information directly to the federal 
government without a myriad of decision makers adding to the confusion allowed for a 
much quicker response.  
In 2003, FEMA fell beneath the realm of DHS and lost much of its power. Being 
one of the smallest agencies in the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA felt the 
squeeze more than others. It was denied as much as $80 million a year and was forced to 
compete with the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) for any remaining funds 
(Cooper & Block, 2006, p.84). Within the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA and 
ODP have overlapping responsibilities in terms of protecting the populace. While FEMA 
“distributes grants for public health, medical preparedness, and natural disaster response 
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training, ODP does the same, but specifically for acts of terrorism” (Kettl, 2004, p.19). 
There was a fear that “if FEMA picked up terrorism as a responsibility, it would consume 
the time, energy and resources needed to respond to natural disasters” (Cooper & Block, 
2006, p.65).  
FEMA stated for years that it needed to “run the whole show” during local 
emergencies in order for states to have a one-stop shop regarding grants (Cooper & 
Block, 2006, p.85). Whether the source of a disaster stemmed from natural or man-made 
causes, FEMA believed that emergency response in terms of financial resources would be 
very similar. Unfortunately, at the end of the day the split between FEMA and ODP has 
remained, and work between the two organizations is still dangerously uncoordinated. As 
such, states do not have a unified figure regarding accessing federal government 
assistance, and it seems as though “many of the most important problems the country 
faces today simply do not match the federal institutions created to govern them” (Kettl, 
2009, p.25).  
Applying Lessons to Issues of Funding 
While local government may be the first step in responding to an emergency, 
federal agencies are intended to provide additional support and resources. When it comes 
to directing financial resources strategically to state and local governments, however, 
“promised federal aid has thus far flowed slowly and has been allocated more on the 
basis of pork than need” (Kettl, 2004, pp.7, 9). Since the beginning of this century there 
has been little support at the federal level for substantial new investments in local 
emergency activities (Frist, 2002, p.1). Many state governments, already suffering due to 
a significant nation-wide budget crisis, have thus struggled to provide sufficient monies 
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to their local first responders. A recent government report found that “seventy-one 
percent of law enforcement agencies and over half of fire departments have reported no 
increases in funding” in years (Kettl, 2004, p.18). If the federalist system is to truly work 
in the face of a biological attack then, it seems as though local and state governments 
must be further strengthened with additional funding from the federal government.  
Specifically for disease events and environmental hazards, senators in Congress 
have long refused to sponsor acts that provide state infrastructures with the additional 
funding necessary to enhance preparedness levels (Bryan & Fields, 1999, p.1). 
Throughout recent history, the bulk of the United States’ government spending on bio-
defense went to the Pentagon for studies and for equipment like detectors, suits, vaccines, 
and masks, rather than to the actual states. Regarding biological emergencies then, little 
money has thus far been allocated to strengthening the local health facilities that would 
actually have to contain an infectious outbreak. 
So far only a few calls to action have been made in the realm of federal assistance 
through funding. In June 2002, President Bush signed into law the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act which authorized greater funding to the 
states in the face of biological attack. Then in 2005, he submitted a request for an 
additional $7.1 Billion (Osterholm, 2007, p.8).  
Thus far, it appears as though some states have benefited from this act, but 
definitely not all, with “evidence indicating that additional assistance is required to meet 
state and local needs” (Wise & Nader, 2002, p. 48). According to the U.S. General 
Accounting Office, “poor interagency coordination within the federal government and 
inadequate top-down federal, state, and local cooperation has [thus far] accompanied any 
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additional spending activity,” making organized financial investments within the states 
nearly impossible (Kincaid & Cole, 2002, p.183). So while emergency management has 
become a bottom-up process, regarding resources, federal assistance has not been kind to 
local governments and has remained a dysfunctional and limited top-down approach 
(Waugh & Sylves, 2002, p.149).  
Why Proper Funding is Essential  
 
Naturally occurring pathogenic invasion is a unique type of threat. To the naked 
eye pathogens are invisible, making them perhaps more terrifying than standard threats to 
society. Similarly frightening, authorities would have very little knowledge of exactly 
who was infected during an outbreak as news spread and even unexposed individuals 
experience pseudo-symptoms out of paranoia and fear. These individuals “will add 
complexity and additional patients for triage during the crisis,” warranting trained 
medical personnel who can quickly differentiate between pseudo-patients and those 
actually infected (Lederberg, 1999, p.254).  
Oftentimes with limited local funds, personnel and resources required to prevent 
disease compete with those created to treat disease, often known as the “crowding out 
effect” (Lamptey et al, 2006, p.16). In this sense, while a majority of local funds are 
directed towards treatment methods, procedures such as appropriate containment 
procedures are often pushed aside. During a biological emergency, however, it is 
essential that those susceptible to infection but not yet exposed are separated from the 
contagious quickly and efficiently. As of now, most local public health facilities are not 
designed to accommodate a large number of highly contagious people, and thus have no 
proper means of isolating them from an uncontaminated public. 
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According to many experts, “a modest program of $35 million a year” could train 
emergency personnel in key cities and create within those cities designated quarantine, 
treatment, and contaminated areas (Frist, 2002, p.3). There is a question of how key cities 
are defined and identified, however, and DHS has in the past designated about 120 cities 
to receive additional funds. Mistakenly, many of these cities were selected based on 
population, rather than inherent need or actual likelihood of becoming threatened by 
either natural or intentional biological attack however. Overall, if polycentric methods of 
disease mitigation are to work, the federal government must become aware of which 
localities are most vulnerable and most in need of additional fiscal support.  
Funding and Disease Detection  
Whether stemming from intentional or natural sources, in the face of a biological 
disaster it is necessary for sates to first have the ability and resources to rapidly identify, 
investigate, and especially control the consequences of pathogenic invasion (Bryan & 
Fields, 1999, p.2). To prevent further spread, diseases must be reported in a timely 
manner and appropriate health responses must be immediately triggered (M’ikanatha et 
al, 2003, p.1). Funding for greater technologies, training, and telecommunications 
networks that support disease surveillance, dissemination of health information, and co-
ordination of emergency response activities are thus necessary.  
In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) are typically 
responsible for tracking the spread of an emerging disease. The CDC classifies biological 
agents into three categories. Category A consists of the most dangerous, high priority 
agents including: anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, and viral hemorrhagic fevers like 
Ebola. Category B consists of food safety threats like Salmonella, as well as Ricin toxin, 
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Typhus fever, etc. Category C “includes emerging pathogens that could be engineered for 
mass dissemination due to: availability, ease of production and dissemination, and 
potential for high morbidity and mortality rates” (Hamburg et al, 2008, p. 5). 
Once the biological agent at the source of an epidemic is identified and 
categorized, the CDC, in coordination with the Department of Health and Human 
Services, is then in charge of communicating health-related information and guidance. In 
order for the CDC to efficiently monitor and track disease outbreaks, identify new 
diseases, provide laboratory support, and disseminate expert advice and control measures, 
states and local health departments must first have the technological ability to rapidly 
acquire and send out local disease information.  
To have the rapid assessment and reporting of data on disease occurrence needed 
during an emergency, the communications-sharing network will have to be seamless. 
Local public health departments will need “standardized protocols via a multilevel 
laboratory response network that links hospital, commercial, veterinary, food and water 
laboratories together” (Khan et al, 2000, p.2). Universal coding standards are also 
necessary. Most importantly, there must be qualified personnel available to properly 
interpret and input results. Automated systems after all are a “complement, [not] a 
substitute for human involvement in interpreting laboratory findings and screening for 
errors” (M’ikanatha et al, 2003, p.1). 
In this sense, funding must be directed towards acquiring “an adequate number of 
epidemiologists trained in detection, control, and treatment of biological agents” (Bryan 
& Fields, 1999, p.2). Epidemiology is commonly known as the study of those factors 
which affect the health of populations, and it is highly regarded in evidence-based 
 84
medicine for identifying risk factors for disease through preventative approaches. 
Locally, trained epidemiologists, along with updated technological capabilities, can work 
together to prevent any pathogenic outbreak from worsening.  
Despite the fact that threats to human health are ever-present, “the overall system 
of disease surveillance in the U.S. has not developed into a robust, coordinated 
capability” (Hamburg et al, 2008, p.16). The Trust for America’s Health 2005 Report 
found that: “over one-fourth of states [in the U.S.] were rated by the CDC as lacking 
sufficient laboratory response capabilities, nearly half were unable to track disease 
outbreak information, and almost a third had insufficient capacity to expeditiously 
consult with infection control experts” (Johnstone, 2008, p.120). Overall it was 
concluded that laboratory capabilities vary from state to state, with most jurisdictions 
unable to survey a vast range of diseases. “The U.S. first line of defense against diseases 
is thus severely impeded; requiring considerable investment in the development of 
significantly improved surveillance capabilities “(Brower & Chalk, 2003, p.94).  
Applying Lessons to Acts of Biological Terrorism 
The National Intelligence Council predicted that a major terrorist attack 
employing biological agents will likely occur by the year 2020. According to the Council, 
one goal of such an attack would be to “undermine public confidence in the ability of 
local government to protect and defend its citizens, thereby creating a climate of fear and 
intimidation amongst the populace” (Howard et al, 2006, p.63). Terrorists typically look 
to take advantage of any weaknesses they perceive in a region’s ability to detect, prevent, 
and respond to crises.  
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In general, measures to combat acts of biological warfare have not been provided 
proper resources and manpower in the United States. This is dangerous for local regions 
because, unlike with a natural outbreak, an intentional attack would lead to a near-
simultaneous infection of many people, easily overwhelming even the finest health care 
infrastructure (Lederberg, 1999, p.280). Terrorists could further overwhelm local 
emergency response teams by “releasing a recombinant virus that would express itself in 
distinct phases” (Miller et al, 2002, p.232). If such a pathogen was used, first responders 
who would rush to an affected region to contain and treat an outbreak would themselves 
become vectors of a secondary epidemic that they would unknowingly carry back to their 
families. 
In order to minimize the effects of such an attack, local authorities must be aware 
of the threat of biological warfare and have an increased understanding and belief that an 
attack from such a source can in fact occur. Any intentionally released disease will less 
catastrophically ruffle a community alert of the multiple types of risk and possible 
countermeasures (Kellman, 2007, p.160). For this reason, preemptive federal government 
funding to the states is essential. Ideally, finances should trickle down to hospital-
accrediting bodies, as well as local emergency response teams that can encourage both 
bureaucratic and medical facilities to incorporate biological warfare scenarios into their 
annual training (Lederberg, 1999, p.231).  
Detection and Civil Liberties  
In a democratic society, counterterrorism efforts often entail difficult trade offs 
between civil liberties and public safety. Within the United States, local authorities thus 
have an additional problem that they must be aware of; how to enhance biological 
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security without imposing intolerable stresses on personal liberties. Impeded by the 
regulations and paperwork often surrounding issues of informed consent, definitive 
response measures can be unduly postponed (Lemon et al, 2008, p.282). In the realm of 
biological security, this is especially true regarding issues such as quarantine and 
mandatory examinations.  
Issues also arise when certain members of the population do not wish to get 
vaccinated, or refuse to take drugs that have not yet been thoroughly tested. While this 
may place other citizens at risk, it would be difficult for the government to justify 
infringing on citizens' civil liberties beneath these circumstances. In order to enact drastic 
response measures like forced quarantine or vaccination then, there must be an element of 
transparency regarding information that is disseminated to the public.  
Locally, the issue of transparency separates law enforcement from emergency 
managers. On one side, law enforcement officials advocate secrecy and tight security as 
the key to minimizing the trauma of any terrorist attack. On the other side, rescue 
workers and emergency managers emphasize “collaboration, information sharing, and 
public awareness to reduce the impact of disasters” (Cooper & Block, 2006, p.81). They 
claim that “authorities would lose hours or days trying to determine the cause of an 
outbreak, and could be treating with ineffective antibiotics” if they are not given access to 
specific information and methods of mitigation in due time (Armstrong, 2002, p.2). 
If a local government moves toward restraining the flow of information there will 
further be an inevitable clash with the academic research community. This community is 
constantly fighting to keep open the “information exchange that could speed up the 
discovery of vaccines and drugs to treat infectious diseases” (Atlas, 2002, p.754). In 
 87
order to remain continuously ahead of the curve, many informed voices must be heard 
with a variety of choices put forward for consideration, especially in the scientific fields 
(Woolwine, 2007, p.8). Any governance framework that stymies development [could] 
retard research and make the challenge of responsibly developing treatments far more 
difficult in the future (Gostin, 1997, p.689).  
Conclusion 
Overall, it is clear that the events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent events 
like Hurricane Katrina “have underscored the dire need to further transform government 
processes, systems, and organizational frameworks to better protect the American 
people” (Forrester, 2005, p. 25). With an almost infinite number of biological threats and 
targets across the U.S., winning the war against an incoming pathogenic invasion will 
require a change in the way the battle is being fought (Rothkopf, 2002, p.58). Many 
political analysts have noted that “improving the capacity of U.S. governments to provide 
greater homeland security will primarily require changes in the way federal, state, and 
local governments are organized and coordinate with one another” (Wise & Nader, 2002, 
p. 44). 
Thus far, in the sphere of countering biological threats, the federal government 
has allowed for “a hodgepodge of programs that are often conceptually dubious, 
bureaucratically duplicative, poorly coordinated, and disastrously implemented” (Miller 
et al, 2002, p.276). Particularly, state and local officials often report being confused and 
unable to identify the entities in charge of resources. As a result, local authorities do not 
receive sufficient amounts of funding and assistance, and their ability to mitigate the 
effects of a local disaster are thus hindered.  
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Locally there are problems as well. In order to acquire sufficient federal 
assistance, horizontal communication must occur effectively amongst local organizations 
so that relevant information can be elevated vertically to the federal government when the 
time comes. At that point, rather than stepping in to replace local first responders, federal 
agencies must be supportive and cooperative with local authorities, allowing intervention 
to take place not through symbols and force, but rather through the supply of appropriate 
resources and funds.  
It seems as though in terms of a biological emergency, in the longer run, a 
positive mobilization based on efficacy rather than federal dominance is necessary if 
response actions are to be sustained (Graeger, 1996, p.112). Federalist ideals are thus 
essential to emergency response because within a large country such as the United States, 
in order for response to be quick, it must be focused locally. Local capabilities must thus 
be strengthened first and foremost, and the federal government must be willing to 
empower states and local governments with sufficient resources and response capabilities 
prior to a disaster.  
Thus far, it has been a daunting challenge encouraging federal politicians to begin 
spending millions of dollars on research and preemptive resources for threats that may 
not even transpire (Osterholm, 2007, p.5). While it is difficult for humans to plan for low 
probability, high consequence events, and politicians especially tend to overly discount 
ambiguous future rewards in exchange for present and certain short-term costs, the threat 
of a global pandemic is increasing (Gerber, 2007, p.231). When speaking of large-scale 
threats to human health, billions of people could suffer the world over if preemptive 
planning is not taken.  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In order to justify government emphasis on the potential consequences of novel 
biological threats, it has been important to prove that such threats indeed present just as 
great a risk to society as conventional problems. With changing ecologies and capabilities 
of scientists around the world, this thesis has posed just that; that the threat of a newly 
emerging infectious disease epidemic is becoming more and more likely, and that local 
governments are simultaneously becoming less and less prepared to respond to them.  
There are two primary sources specified in previous chapters from which a 
biological catastrophe seems most likely to originate: through naturally occurring 
environmental means and intentional acts against society. While naturally occurring 
viruses and bacteria are ever-present, human encroachment upon every aspect of the 
Earth, from climate to wildlife, combined with advancements in pharmaceutical drugs, 
have allowed for the creation of both stronger and a more widespread release of 
pathogenic agents. In terms of intentional biological attack, biological weapons are the 
poor man’s nuclear bomb. They are not only cheaper and easier to disseminate, but can 
be even more catastrophic. Overall, the many varied cities throughout the United States 
must begin to prepare now for a vast range of biological threats that will arrive to 
challenge human health from an assortment of different sources in the coming years.  
The Concept of Biological Security 
“Since 1975, at least thirty-three new pathogens have emerged to compromise the 
health of the human species” (Price-Smith, 2002, p.3). Despite this fact, within the United 
States the concept of biological security has been defined quite broadly by the political 
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community, becoming a catchword for sorted goals, rather than a stable notion of 
potential disaster. Biological threats stemming from ecological change in particular have 
thus far been overlooked.  Unfortunately, government legitimacy is easily undermined 
out of an inability to respond to crises, and with ecological change, pathogens and disease 
are major threats on the rise.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, ecological shifts can affect the security of human 
health in multiple ways. Most importantly, however, these shifts increase the incidence 
and magnitude of natural disasters such as storms, flooding, etc., which correspondingly 
affect the proliferation of many carriers of disease. Simultaneously arising to threaten the 
health of modern societies are the amplified incidences of hostile terrorist acts. It has 
become apparent that the relative ineffectiveness of past use of biological agents by 
hostile groups provides little insight into the potential consequences of modern 
biotechnological advancements (Lederberg, 1999, p.231).  
In particular, as vast numbers of organisms, including various molds, viruses, etc., 
are easily being created and grown in laboratories, they can also now quickly be 
transported to any corner of the globe. In today’s world, “the jet airplane unintentionally 
provides the ideal mechanism by which pathogens of all types move around the Earth in 
infected humans, host animals, and vectors” (Lemon et al, 2008, 17). Predicting the next 
location and source of an intentional biological attack has thus become nearly impossible.   
Furthermore, given the inability of the U.S. government to eliminate the 
importation of large volumes of illegal drugs into the country, interdiction of the tiny 
amounts of material necessary to carry out a biological attack is evidently hopeless 
(Madden & Wheelis, 2003, 158). Currently, there is very little control at the borders as 
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well as no restrictive barriers between most U.S. states. Both people and the materials 
they carry can thus move freely throughout nation.  
Responding to Contemporary Threats to Human Health  
While for the last few decades the world has been rather lucky in terms of the 
amount of destruction caused by pandemics, recent scares have been good indicators of 
how countries will respond to the potentially heinous outbreaks of infectious diseases of 
the future. In April of 2009, the reemergence globally of Swine Flu put the United States 
to the test. Originating in Mexico, a land-sharing neighbor with the United States, the 
H1N1 influenza virus quickly penetrated U.S. soil.  
While the initial response to H1N1 within the United States was relatively weak, 
ultimately a public health emergency allowing for scarce resources to be freed up to state 
and local agencies was declared. Other than this action, very few other actions were taken 
however. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection decided not to close any borders. 
Screening at points of arrival was thus reduced to the use of “passive selection,” where 
only visually symptomatic people were isolated and questioned. In addition, a much more 
prevalent message was put out by U.S. officials that people needed to take responsibility 
for their own health. Commonsense safety measures were recommended, like covering 
coughs and sneezes with a disposable tissue, washing hands frequently, avoiding 
touching the face, and staying home if sick.  
Unlike within other countries, no masks became available, and no official public 
response plan was immediately put in place. Eventually, a nationwide vaccination 
attempt became the main response effort to stop the flu from spreading. Vaccines are 
often incorrectly emphasized as a panacea for epidemics however. Not only are they 
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extremely expensive to create, with an estimated cost of $5.6 billion for sufficient 
stockpiling of influenza vaccine alone, but a focus on vaccine stockpiling also tends to 
direct government funds away from shoring up the local health facilities needed to 
actually distribute them (Cooper, 2006, p.113). In 2006, “ninety percent of the first $3.8 
billion that Congress appropriated for biological threats was devoted to vaccine 
stockpiling, leaving only $350 million for other improvements to the public health 
infrastructure” (Kellman, 2007, p.175). 
Furthermore, it seems that the country has always experienced some difficulty 
reaching all sectors of the public when it comes to vaccine distribution. In 2003, an 
attempt was made to vaccinate approximately eleven million U.S. health care workers 
and emergency response personnel against smallpox across the nation. Despite best 
efforts, only 40,000 people were actually vaccinated (Hamburg et al, 2008, p.6). A 
similar occurrence has been taking place regarding the H1N1 virus, perhaps because 
“only ten vaccine companies produce over eighty percent of the world’s influenza 
vaccine” (Kellman, 2007, p.180).  
By September 2009, prior to the peak of the actual flu season, 393 lab cases of 
H1N1 were reported within Southern Nevada alone. Dr Ellen M. Fitzpatrick, head of Las 
Vegas epidemiology, confirmed that this was indicative of proper surveillance of the 
disease, but poor isolation methods. As of November 2009, approximately eight months 
after news of the reemergence of H1N1 influenza broke; seventy-seven percent of 
vaccines promised to the public were yet to be distributed.  
While this particular strain of H1N1 influenza virus is one that the world has seen 
in the past, if a novel infectious disease were to crop up, the country would be unable to 
 93
rely on a vaccine as a solution. As of now, “less than 1% of viruses and bacteria have 
been described,” making it very difficult for anyone in the biological profession to 
preemptively generate a vaccine (Pirages & DeGeest, 2004, p.8). There is also the new 
problem of creating a vaccine against a certain disease only to learn that its DNA 
sequence has been intentionally manipulated by hostile groups. This would not only lead 
to costly inefficiencies, but vaccines may not be created in the future out of fear of 
repeating the same mistake.  
Is the City of Las Vegas Prepared?  
 
Unlike with any conventional problem, in order to contain an attack against 
human health, response measures that are both well coordinated and extremely efficient 
would be required. Specifically, if the threat arrives in the form of a highly infectious 
disease, “initial response will not only have to be robust and well rehearsed, but also 
extremely resourceful, since there is only a short window to implement control measures” 
(Khan et al, 2000, p.1). Much of this is reliant upon the coordination that occurs 
horizontally between local government agencies, first responders, and emergency 
managers. Strengthening local agencies thus necessitates providing enough resources and 
well trained people who have the right tools and equipment to deal with any sort of 
threat.  
Focusing on the city of Las Vegas, a case study of local preparedness measures 
and procedures for responding to large-scale disease epidemics was undertaken utilizing 
three types of methodologies. First, interviews of local emergency mangers were 
conducted to perceive their individual levels of preparedness. Second, an analysis of the 
local emergency response plan was undertaken to compare it with interview responses. 
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Third, a historical comparative approach was utilized to determine the efficacy of the 
federalist-dominated, polycentric approach to hazard mitigation. By comparing interview 
responses with both the emergency plan and historical examples of disaster response, the 
goal was to create a comprehensive picture of levels of coordination that take place when 
attempting to mitigate the effects of a localized crisis. 
Overall, judging by interview responses and past government attempts to respond 
to large-scale disaster events, it appears that a city the size of Las Vegas would not 
currently be able to mitigate the effects of a deadly disease epidemic. Interviews revealed 
that while local emergency responders train constantly throughout their careers and do 
consistently communicate with the federal government, they are primarily trained to deal 
with the impacts of  natural disasters and intentional acts of terrorism, not specific threats 
targeting human health. Particularly, very few preparations are being made at the local 
emergency response level for any threat to human health stemming from sources outside 
the realm of previous experience. In this sense, methods used to respond to conventional 
threats are being utilized to respond to disease epidemics.  
While this may seem cost-effective, since it has been stated that any “effective 
strategy to combat threats to human health would include standard approaches of initial 
prevention techniques and subsequent mitigation techniques,” pathogens are a unique 
type of threat (Lederberg, 1999, p.305). Invisible to the human eye and often carried by 
human, animal, or plant hosts, pathogens can enter any region of the country quite easily, 
making prevention techniques extremely difficult. In order to intercept novel diseases and 
their pathways, it thus becomes important  to ensure that significant links in the defense 
chain are aware of the threat as well as appropriately resourced (Nolutshungu, 1996, p.3). 
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The provision of sufficient funding and resources is essential during a localized 
epidemic because such funding is primarily funneled towards containment, treatment, 
surveillance, and tracking procedures. When a contagious pathogen is unleashed, there is 
a need to “immediately be able to diagnose the threat, quickly decide on the most 
effective courses of action, and respond in an integrated fashion within extremely 
compressed time frames” (Wise & Nader, 2002, p.46). State and local health 
departments, responsible for disease surveillance, must thus be able to efficiently allocate 
limited funds amongst differing local response agencies in order to properly monitor and 
contain any health threat (Hamburg et al, 2008, p.16).  
Hospitals will need special wards that seal the contagious off from the rest, and 
sufficient vaccines, medications, etc. will also need to be provided (Howard et al, 2006, 
p.440). Additionally, sufficient telecommunications capabilities are necessary to properly 
emit warnings as well as specific advice on what people can do to protect themselves in 
order to reduce risk. Each of these measures is quite costly, and with “only six percent of 
[government] funds allocated to strengthening the public-health infrastructure” any sort 
of health threat can easily become a crisis (Frist, 2002, p.2).  
Thus far, as stated in Chapter 4, many response agencies within the city of Las 
Vegas have remained without sufficient funding, resources, and technological 
capabilities. Additionally, in terms of preparations made by response agencies, there are 
no clearly defined performance standards or self-evaluations to test performance 
measures locally. While the city of Las Vegas has not prepared itself for specific 
pathogenic threats, unique to the city is that it is dependent on tourism and the fact that a 
disease can spread quite quickly, easily, and without much control amongst the visiting 
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population. For this reason, the city has much more to lose if it does not prepare itself for 
the potentially hazardous effects of a local disease outbreak.  
Even if a city of one million inhabitants had adopted a biological defense 
infrastructure strong enough to save ninety-five percent of its population, it would still 
sustain 50,000 casualties (Lederberg, 1999, p.279). Las Vegas has twice this population, 
and is far from able to save ninety-five percent. For this reason, policymakers in Las 
Vegas will need to be aware of first responder and health-related infrastructural 
capabilities. Whatever the source of an epidemic, being able to properly respond and 
recover has the potential to greatly reduce casualties and hence is an important 
government goal.  
The Promotion of Federalist Ideals 
“Good health is a fundamental resource for social and economic development,” 
and thus its maintenance is a primary objective for any government (Menne & Ebi, 2006, 
p.395). Within the United States there is still much room for improvement and efficiency 
in the processes of federal government response methods however. “Officials and the 
public are quick to forget, and thus have been fated to repeat past policy mistakes” 
(Waugh, 2000, p.51).  
Specifically, mistakes regarding emergency response procedures to Hurricane 
Katrina have yet to be resolved. During this crisis, the federal government did not honor 
its commitment to assisting local Louisiana response teams through resources rather than 
power struggles. As a result, federalist ideals came into action to mitigate effects of the 
disaster in the form of nearby state emergency agencies. From the aftermath of this 
hurricane, it has become apparent that local emergency response mangers must fight the 
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instinct to look back rather than forward, as well as fight an instinct to think vertically 
rather than horizontally across government levels during a localized emergency.  
Another lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina is the fact that, during regional 
disasters, the federal government tends to focus more on symbols of security than what 
will best assist incapacitated citizens. In order for response to an emergency to be 
efficient then, reactionary measures must truly work from the bottom up, so that time is 
not wasted, procedures duplicated, bureaucracy and paperwork allowed to get in the way, 
and an overall lack of coordination allowed to ensue. To accomplish this task, the federal 
government must commit to providing preemptive support functions to local emergency 
response agencies.  
Overall, local government agencies have much to improve on if they plan on 
being prepared for a vast range of biological emergencies. Policies governing the 
protection of: domestic agriculture, infrastructures that preserve human health, and 
methods of vector control, are significant areas that must be strengthened and  
policymakers must present preparedness for biological threats originating from these 
areas as an important goal.  
Policy processes often feature long periods of incremental change, occasionally 
punctuated by brief periods of extreme policy alterations. These sudden policy alterations 
are often due to novel advances in information regarding past beliefs. Following the 
previous five chapters, the hope is that such extreme change will occur now in the realm 
of local biological security measures. Local response agencies can utilize the information 
in this thesis concerning potential disease uprising and spread to begin planning seriously 
for the threat of emerging epidemics.  
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This thesis has tested three hypotheses: that the threat of emerging infectious 
diseases is likely and thus should be taken more seriously by policymakers; that 
emergency managers within many local regions are not prepared to deal with a large-
scale, deadly disease outbreak; and that federal government intervention in response to 
these problems, when not arriving in the form of greater funding and resources, often 
only serves to confuse mitigation measures. While conclusions have pointed to the fact 
that each of these hypotheses are true, unfortunately “the effectiveness of emergency 
management policies and programs are difficult to measure until after a disaster occurs” 
(Waugh, 2000, p.52). As such, recommendations can be made regarding ways to better 
prepare for a large-scale epidemic, but the only way to truly see how prepared local 
regions are is to wait for the inevitable to occur.  
Even if potential epidemics are prepared for but do not immediately materialize, 
governments must not let planning fatigue take place leading to a loss of interest in the 
subject (Osterholm, 2007, p.6). Diseases and bacteria are ever present and will remain, as 
they have always been, a significant area of concern. Looking at past predictions of 
potential calamity, “the risks of erring on the side of caution tend to be fewer than the 
costs of dismissing predicted threats” (Linden, 2006, p.2). As the country becomes better 
equipped, trained and prepared to deal with the effects of biological invasion, that 
defensive capability will only serve to strengthen the nation as whole.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
Questions for the Southern Nevada Health District  
 
• What is your professional title/position? 
• What is the type of your highest degree or training? 
 
• From what types of factors has your department anticipated an epidemic to originate?  
• Are veterinarians incorporated into prevention, surveillance and mitigation plans? 
• Please rank from numbers 1 to 4 how concerned your organization is about the 
following potential health effects of climate change:  
o deaths and injuries due to increased incidents of floods? 
o illnesses due to increased intensities of heat waves? 
o increased cases of vector-borne diseases?  
o increased cases of illnesses due to bacteria?  
• Do you receive routine transmissions of meteorological information? 
• Is there a program to monitor population health during natural disasters? Does it 
include:  
o recent mortality rates? 
o doctor reports and recent hospital admissions throughout the region? 
o emergency room consultations? 
• How are marginalized groups looked at and dealt with regarding surveillance, 
prevention, and mitigation of infectious disease?  
• Where is information regarding pandemic preparedness/response located? How can 
people receive information from your organization during a pandemic? 
• How is self care advice provided or advice on how to reduce risk of infection?  
• Is the public notified regarding who to contact to obtain such information?  
• Regarding the occurrence of a pandemic, have businesses been encouraged to develop 
plans to ensure they have the information needed to properly plan and enact 
procedures allowing for the continuation of their business during episodes of staff 
sickness, etc.? 
• How will the health sector address personnel absenteeism?  
• Are physicians being trained to handle extra demand when necessary?  
• What estimates have been made of the demand for critical care beds in the event of a 
pandemic?  
• What is current bed utilization?  
• How much bed capacity could be released and within what amount of time?  
• How many primary care facilities have a pandemic emergency plan in place now? 
• For which types of diseases are vaccines/ antiviral drugs currently being stocked?  
• What does the stockpile look like in terms of ratio to current population? 
• How will the vaccine be distributed?  
• Will prescriptions be necessary? 
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• Is there any sort of contract made to ensure the supply of any specific types of 
vaccines?  
• Have provisional immunization priority groups been drawn up regarding 
administering vaccines/antiviral drugs?  
• When are priority groups to be resorted to?  
• Have you tested preparedness?  
• How are preparedness tests funded?  
• Overall, what are the graduated series of public health measures that would be 
implemented to reduce impact and help control a local epidemic? 
• Is there any additional information that you think would help me describe the 
preventative and response measures of your department? 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions for Local Clark County Heads of First Response 
 
• What is your professional title/position? 
• What is the type of your highest degree or training? 
• Where is information regarding pandemic preparedness/response located?  
• How can people receive information from your organization during a pandemic? 
• Please name the section of or the person responsible for: 
o protecting human health from invading threats 
o disaster preparedness plans 
o mobilization and response during emergencies 
• How many first responders are there in your department who specialize in county-
wide biological emergency situations? 
• What budget is provided to them?  
• Is there a next-in-line succession order ensuring a pipeline of successors for critical 
posts? 
• Does your agency have a comprehensive training plan put in place for biological 
emergencies that specifies:  
o Objectives?  
o Participants?  
o Periodic reviews?  
o Budgets?  
o Back-up resources?  
o Simulation exercises?  
• Are pre and post-assessments conducted to measure training comprehension levels 
and overall effectiveness of training programs?  
• When was your emergency plan last revised? 
 
• Does this agency consistently remain in contact with, local, state, regional, and 
national emergency responders and governments? 
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• What are the stages for disaster relief at the local level and upwards? 
• How would you describe the amount of coordination that occurs between local, state, 
and federal agencies when preparing for an emergency?  
 
• How concerned are you and your organization about the following health effects of 
climate change: deaths and injuries due to floods, illnesses due to heat waves, 
increased cases of vector-borne diseases?  
• Do you receive routine transmissions of meteorological information? 
• Do your emergency measures include those for: floods, cold spells, extreme heat 
waves, windstorms, food or water-borne illnesses, vector infestations, or infectious 
diseases? 
• Do your emergency plans involve an assessment of which areas and people are most 
susceptible within the county to certain types of biological threats?  
 
• How high would you rank emergency preparedness in the realm of pandemics? 
• What current steps are being taken to preempt local spread of the H1N1 virus?  
• During a pandemic: 
o Will people be prevented from traveling?  
o How will the city coordinate transportation issues? 
o How will tourism be dealt with? The hotels?  
o Will there be screening at points of entry in the state? When will this be 
utilized? How? By Who?  
o Will the borders remain open to people and/or supplies during a pandemic? 
Are there circumstances under which the border would be closed (e.g., a 
certain phase of the pandemic)? 
• In the event of a health emergency, are you most prepared to deal with temperature 
stresses, or diseases due to natural or intentional causes?  
• How concerned are you and your organization about the potential effects of an 
intentional biological attack upon the city of Las Vegas?  
 
• Is there any additional information that you think would help me describe the 
preventative and response measures of your department? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS 
 
Electronic Communication with Major David M. Sellen, Commander of the 92nd Civil 
Support Team in charge of Weapons of Mass Destruction (July 1, 2009).  
 
• What is the type of your highest degree or training?  
BA- History, Some Graduate work in Homeland Security/ Disaster and Emergency 
management. 
 
• Where is information regarding pandemic preparedness/response located?  
Pandemic preparedness/response is located in the NV Emergency Operations Plan. 
 
• How can people receive information from your organization during a pandemic?  
People can receive information by contacting the Joint Forces Headquarters for the NV 
National Guard. 
 
• How many first responders are there who specialize in county-wide emergency 
situations?  
Depending on the type of emergency, any where from eight to a few hundred personnel. 
This also varies depending on whether it is a city/county/state/federal asset that is 
responding.  
 
• What budget is provided to them?  
Most operate on a county budget, supplemented with state grants, and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) funding. In the case of my unit, we are provided a budget 
from federal funding. 
 
• When was your emergency plan last revised?  
2008. 
 
• Does this facility consistently remain in contact with, local, state, regional, and 
national emergency responders and governments?  
Yes. 
 
• What are the stages for disaster relief at the local level and upwards?  
Local/State Resources, Local/State Emergency Declarations, Federal Assistance, FEMA 
(DHS) Assistance. 
 
• How concerned are you and your organization about the following health effects of 
climate change: deaths and injuries due to floods, illnesses due to heat waves, 
increased cases of vector-borne diseases?  
We are more concerned with effects of vector-borne diseases than any of the other events 
listed above. 
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• Do you receive routine transmissions of meteorological information?  
Yes. 
 
• Do your emergency measures include those for: earthquakes, chemical spills, floods, 
cold spells, extreme heat waves, windstorms, food or water-borne illnesses, vector 
infestations, or infectious diseases?  
With regard to responding in order to support civil authorities, yes. 
 
• Do you have a plan to prevent the impacts of climate related floods, drying, or disease 
infestations?  
No. We would fall under the State Emergency Operations Plan which would cover these 
issues. 
 
• Does it involve: an assessment of which areas and people are most susceptible?  
With respect to floods, fires, and earthquakes it does. It is not specific on disease 
infestations. 
 
• How high would you rank emergency preparedness in the realm of pandemics?  
Solely based on the recent response to the H1N1 I would rank emergency preparedness as 
high. 
 
• In the event of a health emergency, are you most prepared to deal with temperature 
stresses, or diseases due to natural or intentional causes?  
Diseases due to intentional causes. 
 
• During a pandemic: 
o Will people be prevented from traveling?  
Unsure. 
o How will the city coordinate transportation issues?  
More than likely it will be coordinated between TSA and NDOT. 
o How will tourism be dealt with? The hotels?  
I’m sure it won’t be a pleasant situation. 
o Will there be screening at points of entry in the state? When will this be 
utilized? How? By Who? 
I’m sure screening points will be established when a serious threat of spread is identified. 
How this will happen/who will lead, will depend on who the lead state/federal agency is. 
o Will the borders remain open to people and/or supplies during a pandemic? 
Are there circumstances under which the border would be closed (e.g., a 
certain phase of the pandemic)?  
Not sure. 
 
• Is there any additional information that you think would help me describe the 
preventative and response measures of your department.  
The bottom line is we provide a response unit to the incident commander to identify 
CBRNE/WMD hazardous substances, Assess, Assist, and Advise the IC. 
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Personal Communication with Nicole Hart, Emergency Preparedness Manager for the 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) (October 7, 2009).  
 
• What is the type of your highest degree or training? 
Bachelors in Criminal Justice 
 
• How can people receive information from your organization during a pandemic? 
Information would be delivered through a Joint Information Center with all other media 
representatives from government agencies locally. 
 
• Please name the section of or the person responsible for: protecting human health 
from environmental threats, disaster preparedness, mobilization and response during 
emergencies 
The lead agency for Environmental Health emergencies is the SNHD.  The other items 
are all addresses at the city and county level.  Each has individuals designated to handle 
the preparedness and planning aspects.  At LVMPD the Emergency Management Section 
in the Homeland Security Bureau is responsible for agency preparedness, coordinating 
with other local, state and federal partners as well as the public. 
 
• How many first responders are there who specialize in county-wide emergency 
situations? 
All first responders are trained to respond to emergency situations regardless of 
jurisdiction. 
 
• What budget is provided to them?  
They will operate off of their own department budget unless it is a federally declared 
emergency that is reimbursable 
 
• When was your emergency plan last revised? 
Currently being revised right now 
 
• Does this facility consistently remain in contact with, local, state, regional, and 
national emergency responders and governments? 
Yes it is an ongoing effort.  
 
• What are the stages for disaster relief at the local level and upwards? 
Every emergency is handled based on the situation needs.  We do not have pre-planned 
stages attached to a response from LVMPD. 
 
• How concerned are you and your organization about the following health effects of 
climate change: deaths and injuries due to floods, illnesses due to heat waves, 
increased cases of vector-borne diseases?  
Any type of event that can affect the safety of our community is a priority to us.  
 
• Do you receive routine transmissions of meteorological information? 
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Yes through the weather radios and local updates distributed by the National Weather 
Service or Clark County Office of Emergency Management 
 
• Do your emergency measures include those for: earthquakes, chemical spills, floods, 
cold spells, extreme heat waves, windstorms, food or water-borne illnesses, vector 
infestations, or infectious diseases? 
Yes, we use an all hazards approach to emergency planning as directed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency.  Certain local hazards are addressed individually in the 
Clark County Emergency Response Plan and Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
 
• Do you have a plan to prevent the impacts of climate related floods, drying, or disease 
infestations? 
Most of those types of plans are handled by other agencies such as the Regional Flood 
Control District and SNHD 
 
• How high would you rank emergency preparedness in the realm of pandemics? 
Pandemic Planning has been a very important factor in the U.S. over the past few years.  
It is one of our agencies top priorities 
 
• During a pandemic: 
o Will people be prevented from traveling?  
The CDC and SNHD will make those decisions 
o How will the city coordinate transportation issues? 
Transportation issues will be coordinated amongst multiple agencies (NHP, LVMPD, 
NDOT, Public Works, RTC, etc.) 
o How will tourism be dealt with? The hotels?   
The situation will help determine what the needs are of the hotels.  Coordination will 
come from the Las Vegas Security Chiefs Association as well as individual hotels if there 
are certain measures/concerns that are more severe at a specific location 
o Will there be screening at points of entry in the state? When will this be 
utilized? How? By Who?  
It has been discussed at the County level but all points of entry would be handled by the 
lead agency; Nevada Highway Patrol.  I am unaware if there is a plan in place for this or 
not. 
o Will the borders remain open to people and/or supplies during a pandemic?  
Unknown to me  
 
• In the event of a health emergency, are you most prepared to deal with temperature 
stresses, or diseases due to natural or intentional causes?  
As law enforcement we will be a support agency for either situation.   
 
• Is there any additional information that you think would help me describe the 
preventative and response measures of your department. 
As a law enforcement agency we support all activities and emergencies that affect our 
community.  
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Combined Personal Communications with Alan Osborne, Clark County’s Senior Deputy 
Fire Chief and Richard Brenner, Head of Clark County Fire Department’s Hazardous 
Response Team (October 16, 2009).  
 
• What is the type of your highest degree or training? 
Bachelor Degree in Fire Administration.   
Specialized training as a fire officer, hazmat technician, Incident Commander, emergency 
medical technician, paramedic. 
 
• Where is information regarding pandemic preparedness/response located?  
The Center for Disease Control website: cdc.gov 
Southern Nevada Health Department website: southernnevadahealthdistrict.org 
 
• How can people receive information from your organization during a pandemic? 
Clark County’s website: accessclarkcounty.com 
Clark County Fire Department Public Information Officer 
Public Service announcements 
 
• Please name the section of or the person responsible for: 
o protecting human health from invading threats 
Southern Nevada Health District 
o disaster preparedness plans 
Clark County Office of Emergency Management 
o mobilization and response during emergencies 
Clark County Office of Emergency Management 
Clark County Fire Department 
Las Vegas Fire & Rescue 
Henderson Fire Department 
North Las Vegas Fire Department 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
North Las Vegas Police Department 
Henderson Police Department 
Clark County Public Works 
Southern Nevada Health District 
Nevada National Guard/ 92 Civil Support Team 
Nellis Air Force Base 
 
• How many first responders are there in your department who specialize in county-
wide biological emergency situations? 
The Clark County Fire Department staffs the Hazardous Materials response team with 30 
technicians across a three platoon work schedule.  On any given day, we would have 
between 8 and 10 technicians on duty to respond to an immediate threat.  The balance of 
the technicians would have to be called back if the incident required the full complement 
of 30 technicians. 
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• What budget is provided to them?  
A designated hazmat budget is minimal, most of the funding for the team and equipment 
comes from the County General Fund and is simply included in the operating budget of 
the fire department.  Additionally, there is some grant money that is specifically 
designated to hazardous materials training and response, but typically these grant monies 
are controlled and distributed by the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) with 
the monies being parceled out to each of the response agencies within Clark County. 
 
• Is there a next-in-line succession order ensuring a pipeline of successors for critical 
posts? 
There is no formal program in place supporting succession planning. 
 
• Does your agency have a comprehensive training plan put in place for biological 
emergencies that specifies: Objectives? Participants? Periodic reviews? Budgets? 
Back-up resources? Simulation exercises?  
The hazardous materials team and technicians receive the most comprehensive training of 
all the members of the fire department.  The remaining first responders are trained to the 
operations level and depend on the hazardous materials team for mitigation of incidents 
that would require specialized training and/or person protective equipment. 
The Clark County Fire Department does utilize an extensive training program that is 
recognized by the Nevada State Fire Marshals Office.  Additionally, the current collective 
bargaining agreement that binds labor and management specifies that members of the 
CCFD hazardous materials team attend specialized training while they are members of 
the team.  Captains(Supervisors) who are members of the team must also attain hazmat 
instructor certification during their assignment to the team along with hazmat specialist 
certification. 
 
• Are pre and post-assessments conducted to measure training comprehension levels 
and overall effectiveness of training programs?  
Our emergency responders train constantly throughout their careers.  Some of this 
training has accompanying written post tests, however, the primary testing component of 
the fire department once one is on the job, centers around promotional exams and 
emergency medical certification. 
 
• When was your emergency plan last revised? 
The Clark County Office of Emergency Management “Emergency Operational Manual,” 
was last revised in January 2004.  It may currently be under revision as I am unable to 
access the manual on the OEM website.   
 
• Does this agency consistently remain in contact with, local, state, regional, and 
national emergency responders and governments? 
Yes. 
 
• What are the stages for disaster relief at the local level and upwards? 
Any local jurisdiction within Clark County would first contact the Clark County Office of 
Emergency Management to request assistance, if the request for assistance was beyond 
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the capability of the County, the request would go to the Nevada State Office of 
Emergency Management and if beyond the State’s capability, the request would be 
forwarded to the National level.  With this stated, please note that most agencies within 
Clark County already have existing automatic and mutual aid agreements in place so 
authorization to grant resource requests at the local level does not necessarily need to be 
approved by the Clark County Office of Emergency Management, however depending 
upon the significance of the incident, they do need to be advised of County resource 
deployments and commitments. 
 
• How would you describe the amount of coordination that occurs between local, state, 
and federal agencies when preparing for an emergency?  
There is always room for improvement.  A good test of this very question may be 
answered in early 2010 when a National Level Exercise is held in the Las Vegas valley.  
Local, State and National response organizations will all be involved. 
To use a local example of the cooperation that exists within the valley for planned events, 
the New Years Eve event involves many agencies and members of the resort industry all 
working together.   
 
• How concerned are you and your organization about the following health effects of 
climate change: deaths and injuries due to floods, illnesses due to heat waves, 
increased cases of vector-borne diseases?  
The fire service responds to emergencies as they occur.  We also do our best to pre-plan 
for events.  We do address our ability to provide emergency service to the community in 
the wake of floods and heat waves.  Vector borne diseases and climate change are beyond 
our scope of operations and quite simply we would respond to victims in much the same 
way that we do now.  We have the ability to respond and treat patients who exhibit a 
variety of symptoms and medical conditions.  Our response is focused on emergency 
medicine and patient stabilization so that they may be transported to hospitals where they 
may receive definitive advanced medical care.  
 
• Do you receive routine transmissions of meteorological information? 
Yes, the local office of the U.S. National Weather Service contacts our Fire Alarm Office 
with this type of information. 
 
• Do your emergency measures include those for:  
o floods 
Yes 
o cold spells 
There is no specific Fire Department Operations Plan 
o extreme heat waves 
The County does open cooling centers within the valley during extreme heat warnings 
o windstorms 
No, other than the warnings from the National Weather Service 
o food or water-borne illnesses 
No 
o vector infestations 
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Only a bee response plan 
o infectious diseases 
No 
 
• Do your emergency plans involve an assessment of which areas and people are most 
susceptible within the county to certain types of biological threats?  
The existing emergency plans do not identify specific areas within the valley by 
geographic location or demographics that are most susceptible to certain types of 
biological threats. The shelter-in-place option and the decision to implement this action is 
often the best choice to lessen any exposure to the public.  
 
• How high would you rank emergency preparedness in the realm of pandemics? 
The CDC is at the forefront of this issue.  Until events such as the H1N1 virus raise 
public awareness, their work goes unnoticed.  Locally, the health care providers play a 
significant role in the planning for such an event with the Southern Nevada Health 
Department being the lead on the issue. 
 
• What current steps are being taken to preempt local spread of the H1N1 virus?  
The media is actively involved in providing information to the public.  Media campaigns 
are advising the public to practice good hygiene, especially hand washing.   The medical 
community is planning for mass vaccinations and the emergency response community is 
educating their personnel on personal protective equipment and general protective 
measures that they need to observe when treating patients. 
 
• During a pandemic: Will people be prevented from traveling? How will the city 
coordinate transportation issues? How will tourism be dealt with? The hotels? Will 
there be screening at points of entry in the state? When will this be utilized? How? By 
Who? Will the borders remain open to people and/or supplies during a pandemic? 
Are there circumstances under which the border would be closed (e.g., a certain phase 
of the pandemic)? 
Closing down borders, addressing transportation issues, establishing screening points, 
would certainly require resources that most States would not be able to sustain for any 
length of time.  The States may call upon their National Guard resources if such actions 
were actually implemented. 
 
• In the event of a health emergency, are you most prepared to deal with temperature 
stresses, or diseases due to natural or intentional causes? 
I would say the Clark County Fire Department is most prepared to deal with diseases that 
are natural.  We deal with these medical emergencies on a daily basis.   
 
• How concerned are you and your organization about the potential effects of an 
intentional biological attack upon the city of Las Vegas?  
Any metropolitan area within the U.S. border could be a potential target.  As such, the 
local community is very aware and concerned of the potential damage that could result.   
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APPENDIX C 
 
TABLES  
 
Table 1 Biological Agents for Military and Bioterrorist Use 
 
 Traditional Warfare Agents Agents Associated with Bioterror 
Pathogens Bacillus anthracis Bacillus anthracis 
 Brucella suis HIV 
 Coxiella burnetii Typhus  
 Francisella tularensis Salmonella typhis 
 Smallpox Shigella species 
 Viral encephalitides Yellow Fever Virus 
 Viral hemorrhagic fevers Yersinia pestis 
 Yersinia pestis  
Toxins Botulinum Botulinum 
 Ricin Cholera endotoxin 
 Staphylococcal enterotoxin B Diphtheria toxin 
  Nicotine 
  Ricin 
Tetrodotoxin 
 
 Snake toxin 
Anti-crop Rice Blast  
 Rye stem rust  
 Wheat stem rust  
 
SOURCE: Lederberg, Joshua. (1999). Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. p. 229.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Cases of Illicit Use of Biological Agents 
 
SOURCE: Carus, Seth W. (1998, August). Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of biological agents 
in the 20th Century. Working Paper, Center for Counter-proliferation Research. National Defense 
University.  
 
Type Terrorist Criminal Other/Uncertain Total Cases 
Acquire and Use 5 9 0 14 
Acquire 3 5 2 10 
Interest 3 4 0 7 
Threat/Hoax 1 10 3 14 
Total Cases 12 28 5 45 
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Table 3 Dissemination Techniques  
 
Type Terrorist Criminal Other/Uncertain Total Cases 
Aerosolized 2 0 0 2 
Direct injection/ 
Topical application 
3 5 0 8 
Contaminated food 1 15 0 16 
Contaminated water 3 0 2 5 
Insect/Natural vectors 0 1 1 2 
None 2 0 0 2 
Unknown 4 9 2 15 
 
SOURCE: Lederberg, Joshua. (1999). Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. p. 222.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Perpetrator Expertise 
 
Type Terrorist Criminal Other/Uncertain Total Cases 
Medical or scientific 
expertise  
4 12 2 18 
Agricultural expertise 3 13 1 17 
Unknown 5 3 2 10 
Total Cases 12 28 5 45 
 
SOURCE: Lederberg, Joshua. (1999). Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. p. 221.   
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Tables 5 and 6 reveal expert numbers regarding the actual amount of assistance and 
coordination occurring across government levels.  
 
 
Table 5 Matrix of Interacting Organizations Involved In Response Operations to 
September 11, 2001 Attacks  
 
Public 
Organizations  
Federal  
Level 
Interaction  
State  
Level 
Interaction 
County 
Level 
Interaction 
Nonprofit 
Interaction 
Private  
Sector 
Interaction  
Executive Office  1% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Department of 
Transportation 
3.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
National 
Communication 
Services 
1% 4.8% 66.7% 0.0% 2.6% 
Department of 
Defense 
6.6% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 
Department of 
Agriculture 
0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
FEMA 55.1% 66.1% 33.3% 75.9% 76.9% 
Department of 
Health and Human 
Services 
6.6% 11.3% 0.0% 2.5% 2.6% 
EPA 3% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
SOURCE: Kincaid, John and Richard L. Cole. (2002, September). “Issues of Federalism in Response to 
Terrorism.” Public Administration Review. Vol. 62. p. 189.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Frequency Distribution and Number of Organizations Involved In Response 
Operations to September 11, 2001 Attacks  
 
Public Organizations  Number of Organizations Involved  Percent  
Federal 73 19.3 
State 34 9.0 
Regional 9 2.4 
County 2 0.5 
Local 9 2.4 
City 41 10.9 
Nonprofit  64 16.9 
Private 143 37.9 
 
SOURCE: Kincaid, John and Richard L. Cole. (2002, September). “Issues of Federalism in Response to 
Terrorism.” Public Administration Review. Vol. 62. p. 186.  
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